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Abstract
We study the problem of privately emulating shared memory in message-passing networks.
The system includes clients that store and retrieve replicated information on N servers, out of
which e are malicious. When a client access a malicious server, the data field of that server
response might be different than the value it originally stored. However, all other control
variables in the server reply and protocol actions are according to the server algorithm. For the
coded atomic storage (CAS) algorithms by Cadambe et al., we present an enhancement that
ensures no information leakage and malicious fault-tolerance.
We also consider recovery after the occurrence of transient faults that violate the assumptions
according to which the system is to behave. After their last occurrence, transient faults leave the
system in an arbitrary state (while the program code stays intact). We present a self-stabilizing
algorithm, which recovers after the occurrence of transient faults. This addition to Cadambe
et al. considers asynchronous settings as long as no transient faults occur. The recovery from
transient faults that bring the system counters (close) to their maximal values may include
the use of a global reset procedure, which requires the system run to be controlled by a fair
scheduler. After the recovery period, the safety properties are provided for asynchronous system
runs that are not necessarily controlled by fair schedulers.
Since the recovery period is bounded and the occurrence of transient faults is extremely
rare, we call this design criteria self-stabilization in the presence of seldom fairness. Our self-
stabilizing algorithm uses a bounded amount of storage during asynchronous executions (that
are not necessarily controlled by fair schedulers). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to address privacy, malicious behavior and self-stabilization in the context of emulating atomic
shared memory in message-passing systems.
1 Introduction
The increasing availability of fast ubiquitous networking, the appearance of Cloud and Fog comput-
ing, have offered computer users attractive opportunities for remotely storing massive amounts of
data in decentralized storage systems. In such systems, privacy and dependability are imperative.
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We consider distributed fault-tolerant systems that prevent information leakage, deal with mali-
cious behavior and can recover after the occurrence of transient faults, which cause an arbitrary
corruption of the system state, including the state of the mechanisms for storing information, so
long as the program’s code is still intact. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show
that the emulation of atomic shared memory in message-passing systems can be done in a way that
considers information privacy, resilience to malicious behavior and recovery from transient-faults.
1.1 The problem
A distributed storage system uses a decentralized set of servers for allowing clients to access a shared
object concurrently. Register emulation is a well-known method for sharing objects. Among the
three kinds of consistency requirements for registers, atomicity is the strongest one, since it requires
every sequence of concurrent access to the register to appear sequential [38]. Another classification
of register emulation considers the number of clients that can read or write the shared register
concurrently. We consider the more general form of shared memory emulation of an atomic register
in which many clients can read and write concurrently.
1.1.1 Storage and communication costs
Early approaches [4, 40] provided fault-tolerance for distributed emulation of shared registers via
replication. That is, each server is to store an identical copy of the most recent version of the
shared object. These solutions require the read procedure to include a propagation phase in which
the reader updates the servers with the most recent value they read; details appear in [40]. Since in
these early approaches the interaction between the clients and the servers includes sending of the
entire replica, high communication costs are implied. Recent advances in the area [12, 29] are less
costly than these early approaches [4, 40], because their propagation phase messages include only
the control variables, rather than the entire replica. Moreover, using erasure coding, the servers
avoid storing the entire replica by storing only the coded elements, which are tailed individually
to every server. This leads to further reduction in the size of messages in all phases (see further
details in [40, 47]).
1.1.2 Malicious behavior and privacy
The use of erasure coding facilitates, as we show in this paper, allows the satisfaction of requirements
related to malicious behavior and privacy. That is, when a client access a malicious server, the
data field of that server response might be different than the value it originally stored (however,
all other control variables in the response and protocol actions follows the algorithm). Our privacy
requirement is that the collective storage of any set of less than k servers cannot leak information,
where k is a number that we specify next.
1.1.3 Problem specifications
The system has N ∈ Z+ servers that emulate an atomic shared memory, which any bounded set
of clients may access. We consider the integers f, e ∈ Z+ and k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 2(f + e)}. The
coded atomic storage CAS(k) task addresses the problem of multi-writer, multi-reader (MWMR)
emulation of atomic shared memory of a single object CAS(k)’s safety requirement says that the
algorithm’s external behavior follows the ones of atomic memory, and CAS(k)’s liveness require
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the completion of all (non-failing) operations independently of the node availability. From the
communication and storage costs, we interpret the task of CAS(k) to restrict the messages between
clients and server, as well as the storage records, to include only individualized coded elements and
control variables, as in [12].
1.2 Fault model
Our message-passing system is asynchronous and it is prone to (a) fail-stop failures of nodes that
may resume at any time, (b) packet failures, such as omission, duplication, and reordering, and (c)
malicious servers can reply with a message that its data field is different than the originally stored
value (however, all other control variables stay intact and in all other matters malicious servers do
not deviate from the algorithm).
We bound the number of malicious servers is bounded by e. We assume that the number of
failing servers is bounded by f (for correctness sake [39]) and allow them to resume operation at
any time. We assume that failing clients stop taking steps. Note that the client identifiers are
recyclable using incarnation numbers (as we explain in Section 12.1). Thus, although we bound by
N the number of clients that are concurrently active, the number of client life cycles is unbounded
for any practical purpose.
In addition to these benign failures, we consider transient faults, i.e., any temporary violation
of assumptions according to which the system and network were designed to behave, e.g., the
corruption of the system state due to soft errors or the presence of Byzantine nodes. We assume
that these transient faults arbitrarily change the system state in unpredictable manners (while
keeping the program code intact).
1.3 Design criteria
Dijkstra’s seminal work [13] proposed the self-stabilization design criteria, which models transient
faults to occur before the start of the system run, because Dijkstra considered the occurrence of
transient faults to be an extremely rare event that causes the system to start in an arbitrary state.
Dijkstra required self-stabilizing systems to return to correct behavior within a bounded period.
An unfair scheduler of an asynchronous system (with bounded memory and channel capacity)
can cause the system to indefinitely hide stale information, because this adversarial scheduler does
not guarantee that all nodes take steps infinitely often. This stale information is the result of
transient faults, which occur before the system start, however its presence may have a long-term
effect, because this corrupted data can cause the system, at any time, to violate safety. This is
true for any system, in particular, for Dijkstra’s self-stabilizing systems [13], which are required to
specify a bound on the time in which they remove all stale information (whenever they appear).
Without ever restricting the degree in which the scheduler can be unfair, we cannot specify, for
any given system, when it can remove all stale information. Thus, we cannot demonstrate, for any
given system, that the proposed algorithm fulfills Dijkstra’s requirements.
This paper proposes to restrict the scheduler unfairness degree in the following manner: (i)
In the absence of transient faults, the scheduler is unfair and the system guarantees safety and
liveness. (ii) After the occurrence of the last transient fault, the scheduler becomes fair for a period
that is at least as long as the specified system recovery period. That is, after the recovery period,
the scheduler returns to be unfair as in (i) and the system returns to guarantee safety and liveness.
The proposed design criteria, which we call self-stabilization in the presence of seldom fairness,
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address challenges that Dijkstra’s self-stabilization cannot address when the scheduler is always
either fair or unfair.
For example, any transient fault can cause a counter to reach its maximum value and yet the
system might need to increment the counter for an unbounded number of times after that overflow
event. This challenge is greater when there is no elegant way to maintain an order among the
different counter values, say, by wrapping to zero upon counter overflow. Since the scheduler fair
after the occurrence of transient faults and until the end of the recovery period, the system recovery
can handle the overflow event by restarting the system. This work uses a restart procedure that
does not violate safety (but may violate liveness after the occurrence of transient faults). This is a
challenge that Dijkstra’s self-stabilization cannot address when the scheduler is always unfair.
Systems that are self-stabilization in Dijkstra’s sense often assume that the scheduler is always
fair. Here, fail-stop failures are modeled as transient faults, which can occur only before the system
starts to run. Challenges related to fail-stop failures are addressed more adequately by the proposed
design criteria than Dijkstra’s self-stabilization when the scheduler is always fair.
1.4 Related work
1.4.1 Non-self-stabilizing register emulation in message-passing systems
The literature on (non-self-stabilizing) register emulation in message-passing systems includes [4]
single-writer multi-reader (SWMR), and their multi-writer (MWMR) counterparts [29, 40] as well
as solutions that provides (non-self-stabilizing) quorum reconfiguration [31, 32].
Recent advances to the state-of-the-art. As of the time of our publication [26], the
literature considered either (i) unbounded storage during asynchronous system runs that are not
controlled by a fair scheduler, such as CASGC [12], AWE [3], HGR [33] and ORCAS-B [28], (ii)
store, during a write operation, the entire value being written in each server, such as ORCAS-A [28],
and by that incurs a worst-case storage cost, as in [4, 40], or (iii) uses a message dispersal primitive
and a reliable broadcast primitive, such as [11], which during write operations, can let the storage
cost to become as large as the storage cost of replication, see [12] for details.
Advancing the state-of-the-art. In the context of self-stabilization, we cannot consider
unbounded storage cost and this paper, unlike [3, 12, 28, 33], presents a bound on the storage costs
also in the absence of a fair scheduler. Thus, our proposal goes beyond the state-of-the-art in the
case of (i) not only in the context of self-stabilization and privacy. Moreover, unlike [4, 11, 28, 40],
during a single write operation, the added storage cost of the proposed algorithm are similar to the
ones of CASGC [12]. Thus, our proposal goes beyond the state-of-the-art in the cases of (ii) and
(iii) not only in the context of self-stabilization and privacy.
1.4.2 Self-stabilizing register emulation in message-passing systems
As of the time of our publication [26], to the best of our knowledge, there was no self-stabilizing
solution with write operations that do not replicate the new object version among all the system
servers. Also, privacy is not considered.
Self-stabilizing emulation of shared registers that have weaker properties than atomicity (and do
not consider fail-stop failures) exists [23, 34] as well as [9], which consider Byzantine nodes but not
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atomicity. Dolev et al. [24] presented a self-stabilizing algorithm for emulating atomic single-writer
single-reader (SRSW) shared register in message-passing systems. This work considers many-reader
and many writer (MRMW) atomic registers.
Recent advances to the state-of-the-art. Recent solutions for shared memory emula-
tion include practically-stabilizing emulation of SWMR registers [2], and MRMW registers [8, 18].
Pseudo-self-stabilizing emulation of atomic registers is considered in [16] for the case of SWMR.
During asynchronous system runs that are not controlled by fair schedulers, pseudo-self-stabilizing
and practically-self-stabilizing systems satisfy safety requirements after an unbounded recovery pe-
riod (yet finite in the former case). The case of asynchronous system runs that are controlled by
fair schedulers is not considered in [16, 26] for the case of SWMR and in [8, 18] for the case of
MWMR.
Advancing the state-of-the-art. We do not claim that, in the presence of a fair scheduler,
the solutions in [8, 16, 18, 26] have (or have not) a bounded recovery period, but we do point out
that their message size is greater than our proposal by a multiplicative factor of polynomial order
in the number of system nodes (in addition to the fact that their write operations replicate the new
object among all servers).
Our self-stabilizing proposal has a bounded recovery period in the presence of seldomly fair
schedulers. Moreover, in the absence of transient faults (that corrupt the control variables), our
self-stabilizing solution works well in the absence of fair schedulers. Furthermore, one can replace
the type of control variables (tags) that we use with the one of the control variables in [2, 26]
and abandon merely the part of our proposal that appears in Section 3. This replacement is
straightforward. The result will be a practically-self-stabilizing variance of Cadambe et al. [12]
that has a much better use of storage comparing to [8, 16, 18, 26] (at a costs of polynomial factor
of the message size and no bounded recovery period).
We note that after our publication [26], several important results were added to the literature.
For example, Spiegelman et al. [47] considered data items of D bits, concurrency degree if δ, and an
upper bound on the number of storage node failures t, they show a lower bound of Ω(min(t, δ)D) bits
on the space complexity of asynchronous distributed storage algorithms. This implies, for example,
that the asymptotic storage cost can be as high as O(δD). Our upper bound on the storage size
(Section 11) does not contradicts the lower bound of Spiegelman et al. [47] and their Θ(min(t, δ)D)
upper-bound does not consider self-stabilization. To the best of our knowledge, additional advances
in the area of coded atomic storage [35–37], which appeared after our publication [26], do not
consider self-stabilization.
1.4.3 Privacy preservation and malicious tolerance
The CAS algorithm [12] uses erasure codes for splitting the data into different coded elements that
each server stores. As long as at least k coded-elements are available, the algorithm can retrieve
the original information. Cadambe et al. [12] show how to use (N, k)-maximum distance separable
(MDS) codes [43] for improving communication and storage performances. (N, k)-MDS codes map
k-length vectors to an N -length ones. The CAS algorithm lets the writers to store on N servers
k-length vectors. Each of the N servers stores (uniquely) one of the N coordinates of the (N, k)-
MDS-coded information. When retrieving the information, the algorithm can tolerate up to (N−k)
erasures. We address privacy by storing on each server merely parts of the data, as in Shamir’s
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secret sharing scheme [45], which we can implement by Reed-Solomon codes [41] and a matching
error correction algorithm (Berlekamp-Welch [48]).
1.4.4 Proposed techniques of independent interest.
We note that our proposal [26] enhances CASGC [12] from the privacy perspective by also from
the system robustness point-of-view. We use here several techniques of independent interest that
facilitate this improvement. For example, before adding a new object version, the writers query
for the maximum value of the control variables, which are called tags. The writer then couples
the new version with a tag number that is greater than the one returned by the query. We show
this technique preserves atomicity proof of [12] and believe that it is suitable for many other self-
stabilizing algorithms.
Our solution also deals with the following interesting challenge. The rate in which clients
complete write operations can be much faster than the rate in which these clients can inform all
the servers about these operations. This rate can also exceed the rate in which the servers can
inform each other about such updates. The challenge here is imposed by the fact that self-stabilizing
end-to-end protocols must assume that the communication channels have bounded capacities due
to well-known impossibility results [14, Chapter 3.2]. Our solution overcomes this challenge using
techniques that resemble the ones for converting shared memory models to message-passing ones [14,
Chapter 4.2] and an extra phase in the writer procedure. This part of the solution is another key
difference between the proposed algorithm and the one by Cadambe et al. [12].
To the end of bounding the number records that each server needs to store, at any point of
time, a given server record is considered relevant only as long as the servers use it. We show that
no server store more than N + δ+ 3 relevant records during asynchronous system runs that are not
necessarily controlled by a fair scheduler, where δ is a bound on the number of write operations that
occur concurrently with any read operation; this is similar to the δ parameter defined by Cadambe
et al. [12]. The proof technique serves as a self-stabilizing alternative to existing non-self-stabilizing
algorithms that provide bounds on the number of records at the server storage, such as [11, 28], in
a way that does not require storage costs during write operations to be the ones of a fully replicated
solution.
1.5 Our Contributions
We present the algorithmic design for an important component for dependable distributed systems:
a robust shared storage that preserves privacy. In particular, we provide a privacy-preserving and
self-stabilizing algorithm for decentralized shared memory emulation (over asynchronous message-
passing systems) that is resilient to a wide spectrum of node and communication failures as well
as malicious behavior. Moreover, our self-stabilizing algorithm can automatically recovery after
the occurrence of transient faults that violate the assumptions according to which the system is to
behave. Concretely, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first solution that provides:
1. Dependable and efficient emulation of atomic registers over asynchronous message-passing
systems. When starting from a legitimate state, our self-stabilizing solution can:
• Deal with communication failures: The communication channels that are prone to
packet failures, such as omission, duplication, reordering, but the resulted communica-
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tion delays are unbounded yet finite since we assume communication fairness. (That is,
it might take a finite number of retransmissions, but packets are received eventually.)
• Deal with node failures: We show that non-failing clients can retrieve information stored
privately by the N−f non-failing servers. We do not bound the number of failing clients
but we do assume a bound of N on the number of concurrently active clients.
• Deal with malicious behavior: We show that the client can retrieve the originally stored
object in the presence of at most e malicious servers.
• Prevent information leakage: We show that the collective storage of any set of fewer
than k − 1 servers cannot reveal (any version) of the object.
2. Recovering after the occurrence of transient failures. We show that our algorithm can
even recover after the occurrence of transient failures in the following cases. The solution
presentation considers two ‘attempts’ to solve the problems until the third attempt provides
a self-stabilizing solution.
• Unbounded control variables and number records at the server storage: We show that
starting from an arbitrary system state and within O(1) time of fair execution, the
system reaches a legitimate state after which the algorithm satisfies the CAS(k)’s task
requirements even when the scheduler stops been fair and the execution becomes asyn-
chronous. This ‘first attempt’ solution assumes that the servers can store all the object
versions (in addition stale information originated from the system starting state).
• Unbounded control variables but a bounded number of records at the server storage: We
bound the number of relevant records that any server stores, at any point of time, by
N + δ+ 3 during asynchronous system runs that are not necessarily controlled by a fair
scheduler, where δ, similar to Cadambe et al. [12], is a bound on the number of write
operations that occur concurrently with any read operation.
• Bounded control variables and number of records at the server storage: The challenge
here comes from the fact that any transient fault can bring the control variables to
their maximal values. The difficulty here is that there is a need to allow the system to
perform an unbounded number of write operations after this overflow event. We address
this challenge by using a safety-preserving global restart of the control variables (in a
way that may temporarily violate liveness but will leave the most recent version of the
object intact).
Another important contribution of this work is the proposal of new design criteria for self-
stabilizing systems of self-stabilization in the presence of seldom fairness. On the one hand, the
proposed design criteria consider a greater set of algorithms that can be considered self-stabilizing
when comparing to other design criteria [1, 10, 16, 18, 44] that do not consider execution fairness at
all, not even seldomly. On the other hand, it is much easier to design algorithms for the proposed
design criteria than the ones in [1, 10, 16, 18, 44].
1.6 Solution outline and document organization
We bring our interpretation of the system in the self-stabilization context and the CAS task (Sec-
tion 2) before the bringing Cadambe et al. [12] version of CAS (Section 3). We present our privacy-
preserving variation of Cadambe et al.’s algorithm as a basic result (Section 4).
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Non-self-stabilizing CAS
transport layer
CAS(k) by Cadambe et al. 
data link layer
physical layer
network layer 
qroum services
Private and self-stabilizing variation of CAS
self-stabilizing transport layer
self-stabilizing qroum services
The proposed variation of Cadmbe et al. 
self-stabilizing data link layer
self-stabilizing physical layer
self-stabilizing network layer 
self-stabilizing global reset
Figure 1: A possible deployment of the CAS(k) algorithm by Cadambe et al. [12] (on the left) and
the proposed self-stabilizing variation (on the right); this paper contribution appears in bold font.
Our self-stabilizing algorithm requires the specification of a formal model (Section 5) and ex-
ternal building blocks (Section 6). The presentation of this algorithm starts by considering it
unbounded version (Section 7) together with its correctness proof (Section 8). Our proof also
shows that there is a bounded set of relevant records that the servers store (Section 9). This bound
is the basis for the bounded variation of the proposed self-stabilizing algorithm (Section 10) and
its cost analysis (Section 11).
The discussion (Section 12) includes also an elegant extension that extends our settings to con-
sider the possible recovery of failing nodes. We present self-stabilizing implementations (Section 13)
of the gossip and quorum services (specified in Section 6). This part appears in the Appendix be-
cause we do not consider it to be a major part of our contribution.
2 System Overview
The design criteria of self-stabilization have considerations that must be taken into account (in
addition to the ones that exists for non-stabilizing systems). Therefore, before describing the
algorithm by Cadambe et al. [12] and proposing our variation (sections 5 to 11), this section brings
the studied task (Section 2.1) and our interpretation of the system contexts that do (Figure 1,
right), and do not (Figure 1, left), consider privacy and self-stabilization. We note that in the
context of self-stabilization, all system components have to follow the self-stabilization criteria.
2.1 Emulating shared objects
The network include nodes P = {p1, . . . , pN} (processors). Each node pi ∈ P has access to a unique
identifier i and hosts either (i) a server, (ii) a client or (iii) both a server and a client. The server has
access to a storage S, which is a set of records, and the client request the servers to use these records
for updating and retrieving the latest version of the emulated shared object. The coded atomic
storage CAS(k) task addresses the problem of multi-writer, multi-reader (MWMR) emulation of
atomic shared memory of a single object in the above settings. The system uses erasure coding for
the sake of tolerating fail-stop failures of at most f servers (Section 3.1).
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The object value is a member of a finite set V, which dlog2 |V|e bits can represent. We refer to
v0 ∈ V as the default (initial) state of the emulated object. A local source commands its client to run
the reader or writer procedures, sequentially. A call to a reader returns the current version of the
object value. A call to a writer includes the new version of object value and returns upon completion.
A writer associates each write request with a unique tag, t ∈ T , where T = Z+×P and Z+ is the set
of all positive integers. Note that T is a set for which the relation <≡ (z1 < z2)∨((z1 = z2)∧(i < j))
can order totally any pair of tags, (z1, pi) and (z2, pj). We denote the default tag value, t0 < min T ,
as a tag that is not in T and yet it is smaller than any other tag in T .
The detailed specification of task CAS(k) [12] and [39, Chapter 13] considers each version of
the object and requires the algorithm’s external behavior follows the ones of atomic (linearizable)
memory. An atomic shared memory object is one where the commands to the clients and the
returned values from these calls appear as if the object is being accessed sequentially rather than
via concurrent calls to the client procedure. The detailed task specification requires that it would
be possible to include in the system execution serialization points so that the trace of the complete
operations corresponds to the one of a read-write variable type. CAS(k) also requires liveness
with respect to the completion of all (non-failing) operations in any (not necessarily always fair)
execution in which the number of server failures is at most f , where k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 2f}.
2.2 External building blocks
We handle node and communication failures as well as transient faults using common external
building blocks.
2.2.1 End-to-end protocols
The implementation of the system services requires the availability of an end-to-end protocol. Our
self-stabilizing implementation of the services below assumes the availability of self-stabilizing end-
to-end protocols, such as ones in [15, 22]. Note that self-stabilizing end-to-end protocols assume
that the channel has a bounded capacity due to well-known impossibility results [14, Chapter 3.2].
2.2.2 Gossip services
Cadambe et al. assume the availability of a reliable gossip service. They use this non-self-stabilizing
service to propagate reliably among the servers the tag of every object version. We consider a
self-stabilizing gossip service (which we specify in Section 8.2 and suggest an implementation in
Appendix 13). This service lets each gossip message to overwrite the previous gossip message that
is stored in the buffers (without considering whether the previous message was delivered to all
receivers).
Our specifications are motivated by the fact that self-stabilizing end-to-end protocols must
consider communication channels with bounded capacities [14, Chapter 3.2]. Therefore, a specific
quorum of servers might process write operations much faster than the rate in which gossip messages
arrive reliably to servers that are not part of that quorum. Since the communication channels are
assumed to be bounded, it is not clear how can the writer avoid blocking (and still deliver all gossip
messages).
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2.2.3 Quorum services
Quorum systems can be used for ensuring transaction atomicity in replica system despite the
presence of network failures [46]. The term quorum system, Q, refers to all subsets of P , such that
each quorum set Q ∈ Q satisfies the quorum system specifications. For example, Attiya et al. [4]
specify the criterion of dN2 e < |Q|, Cadambe et al. [12] consider k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 2f} and specify
dN+k2 e ≤ |Q|. Our specifications (Section 4.2) consider dN+k+2e2 e, where e is the maximal number
of malicious servers and f is a bound on the ones that can fail-stop.
Cadambe et al. [12] assume that the operations at a given client follow a “handshake” disci-
pline, where a new invocation awaits the response of a preceding invocation. In the context of
self-stabilization, this synchronization between clients and servers is subject to transient faults.
Thus, we specify a service that provides this “handshake” discipline in a self-stabilizing manner
(Section 8.2). (We offer a self-stabilizing implementation of the service in Appendix 13.)
2.2.4 Reset services
Non-self-stabilizing algorithms for shared memory emulation might never reach a tag value that
is (close to) the maximum of T , because T = Z+ × P is unbounded. However, self-stabilizing
algorithm consider only bounded tag values, i.e., for them T = {1, . . . , zmax}×P , where zmax ∈ Z+
is a predefined positive integer. (We use the same notation of T for both variations whenever it is
clear from the context whether the system considers self-stabilization.) Since in the context of self-
stabilizing systems a single transient fault can introduce a tag value that is (close to) the maximum
of T , the proposed algorithm has to overcome a challenge that non-self-stabilizing algorithms for
shared memory emulation often do not consider (with some notable exceptions, e.g., [4, Section 5]).
The proposed self-stabilizing algorithm uses a self-stabilizing global reset mechanism that re-
sembles the one considered in [5]. It helps the algorithm to overcome the case in which the system
state includes a tag that is (close to) the maximum value in T . This reset mechanism leaves the
storage of every server only with the most recent version of the object and replaces its tag value
with a tag that is slightly above t0. We specify the interface between the proposed algorithm and
the self-stabilizing global reset mechanism (Section 6.2) and note that its liveness property requires
schedule fairness.
3 Background
Cadambe et al. [12] use erasure codes for emulating shared memory and use quorums to distinguish
among writer, server and reader nodes. Their algorithm allows multiple writers using a (N, k)
maximum distance separable [43] (MDS) code to write data concurrently to the group of servers
while ensuring atomicity and liveness. This section reviews the definition of (N, k) MDS code before
explaining how to use them for secret sharing in a slightly adapted variation of Cadambe et al. [12].
Cadambe et al. [12] divide the data into a number of coded elements. Each server stores at most
one coded element. Cadambe et al. guarantee that the reader client can fetch the necessary number
of coded elements, such that the reader can retrieve the original data. Given two positive integers
m, k ∈ Z+ : k < m, Cadambe et al. consider an (m, k) Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code
that maps a k-length vector (the input) to an m-length vector (the output). The aim is that after
altering arbitrarily k coordinates of the output vector, a decoding algorithm can still retrieve the
input vector. This way, Cadambe et al. use an (m, k) code for storing the input vector on m
10
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servers, i.e., the server at pi stores the output’s i-th coordinate, because the decoding algorithm is
resilient to (m− k) node failures. We bring the definition of (m, k) MDS code (Section 3.1) before
proving the Cadambe et al.’s CAS(k) algorithm (Section 3.2).
3.1 Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes
Let A be an arbitrary finite set and S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Denote by piS the natural projection mapping
from Am onto S’s corresponding coordinates, i.e., S = {s1, s2, . . . , s|S|}, where s1 < s2 . . . < s|S|,
and define piS : A
m → A|S| as piS(x1, x2, . . . , xm) = (xs1 , xs2 , . . . , xs|S|).
Definition 3.1 (Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code). Let A be a finite set and m, k ∈ Z+ :
k < m two positive integers. An (m, k) code over A is a map Φ : Ak → Am. An (m, k) code Φ
over A is said to be Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) if, for every S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, such that
|S| = k, there is a function Φ−1S : Ak → Ak, such that Φ−1S (piS(Φ(x)) = x for every x ∈ Ak, where
piS is the natural projection mapping.
Cadambe et al. [12] refer to each of the output’s coordinates of an (m, k) code Φ as a coded
element. Further details about Φ and erasure code appear in [12]. We extend the use of (m, k)
MDS code to secret sharing (Section 4.1).
3.2 Cadambe et al.’s CAS(k) algorithm
Cadambe et al. [12] present a quorum-based algorithm for implementing the CAS(k) task. Algo-
rithm 1 is our interpretation of the non-self-stabilizing CAS(k) algorithm by Cadambe et al. [12]
with slight adaptations for the proposed secret sharing scheme.
3.2.1 External building blocks: quorum and gossip communications
Cadambe et al. [12] specify dN+k2 e ≤ |Q| for any k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 2f} and show Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2 (Lemma 5.1 in [12]). Suppose that k ∈ {1 . . . , N − 2f}. (i) If Q1, Q2 ∈ Q, then
|Q1 ∩ Q2| ≥ k. (ii) If the number of failed servers is at most f , then Q contains at least one
quorum set Q of non-failed servers.
Algorithm 1 access the servers via a call to the function qrmAccess(), which returns a set of
replies (records) from at least a quorum of servers. Algorithm 1 also assumes the availability of a
reliable gossip service, which allows the servers to send their most recent finalized tags t ∈ T .
3.2.2 Local variables
The state of the server includes a set of records (t, w, label) ∈ S ⊂ T × (W ∪ {⊥}) × D (line 13),
where the label d ∈ {‘pre’, ‘fin’} refers to metadata that records the phases of the shared-object
updates. The clients carry these updates sequentially and in each phase they access the quorum
system do not end the phase before getting replies from at least a quorum. Algorithm 1 assumes
that when S = ∅, the default triple (t0, wt0,i, ‘fin’) is included in S when reporting on the triple
with the highest locally known tag.
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Algorithm 1: A non-self-stabilizing CAS(k) algorithm (that is based on Cadambe et al. with adaptations
for the proposed secret sharing scheme), code for pi’s client and server.
1 The client: ; /* At any time, pi’s client is a writer, a reader or none but not both */
2 writer(s): ; /* The writer stores secret s as the new version of the shared object */
/* Query for finalized tags and after hearing from a quorum get the maximal tag */
3 let (z, j) := max({t′ : (t′, •) ∈ qrmAccess((⊥,⊥, ‘qry’))}); /* Obtain coded elements w1, w2, . . . , wN, such
that pi ∈ P has a server, by applying the Φ to the secret s. Then, send (t, wi, ‘pre′) to every
server and wait for a quorum of replies. */
4 qrmAccess(((z + 1, i), {Φpj (s)}pj∈P , ‘pre’)); /* The prewrite phase */
/* For each server, send (t, ‘null′, ‘fin’) and wait for a quorum of replies. */
5 qrmAccess(((z + 1, i),⊥, ‘fin’)); /* The finalize phase */
6 return;
7 reader(): ; /* The reader retrieves the current object version, or ⊥ upon failure */
8 let t := max({t′ : (t′, •) ∈ qrmAccess((⊥,⊥, ‘qry’))}) ; /* Query as in line 42 */
/* For each server, send (t,⊥, ‘fin’) and wait for a quorum of replies with the requested coded
elements, which are associated with tag t. */
9 let Q := qrmAccess((t,⊥, ‘fin’)); /* Ask and wait for finalized records from a quorum */
/* Test whether at least kthreshold replies include coded elements so that Φ
−1 can decode the
secret before returning it. If the test fails, return ⊥. */
10 if |{(t, w, ‘fin’) ∈ Q : w 6= ⊥}| ≥ kthreshold then return(Φ−1(w : {(t, w, s) ∈ Q : w 6= ⊥}));
11 else return ⊥;
12 The server:
13 S ⊂ T × (W ∪ {⊥})×D is a record set, where T = Z+ × P is the set of tags, W the set of coded words and
D = {‘pre’, ‘fin’} the set of phases. When S = ∅, we use the default triple (t0, wt0,i, ‘fin’) when reporting on
the triple with the highest locally known tag;
14 upon query arrival from pj ’s client to pi’s server do
15 Reply with (maxPhase(‘fin’),⊥, ‘qry’), where maxPhase(‘fin’) refers to the highest tag in any record
record in S that has a label ‘fin’ (whether that record includes a coded element or not)
16 upon pre-write m := (t, w, ‘pre’) arrival from the pj ’s writer to pi’s server do
17 if @(t, •) ∈ S then S ← S ∪{(t, w, ‘pre’)}; /* add the arriving record to S */
18 Moreover, acknowledge the arriving record by calling reply(j,m).
19 upon finalize m = 〈t,⊥, ‘fin’〉 arrival from pj ’s writer to pi’s server do
20 if ∃(t, w, ‘pre’) ∈ S then /* update the record (t, w, ‘pre’) to (t, w, ‘fin’) in S */
21 S ← (S \ {(t, w, ‘pre’)}) ∪ (t, w, ‘fin’)
22 else add (t,⊥, ‘fin’) to S;
23 Moreover, acknowledge to the writer by calling reply(j,m) and gossip the message (t) to all other servers
by calling gossip(t).
24 upon finalize m := (t,⊥, ‘fin’) arrival from pj ’s reader to pi’s server do
25 if ∃(t, wi, •) ∈ S then
26 S ← (S \ {(t, w, •)}) ∪ {(t, w, ‘fin’)} ; /* update the record (t, wi, •) to (t, wi, ‘fin’) in S */
27 acknowledge the reader with (t, wi, ‘fin’);
28 else
29 S ← S ∪ {(t,⊥, ‘fin’)} ; /* add (t,⊥, ‘fin’) to S */
30 acknowledge to the reader by calling reply(j,m);
31 Moreover, gossip the message (t) to all other servers by calling gossip(t).
32 upon gossip (t) arrival from pj ’s server to pi’s server do
33 if ∃(t, •) ∈ S then update the record (t, •) to (t, •, ‘fin’) in S else add (t,⊥, ‘fin’) to S;
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3.2.3 Protocol phases
Both the writer and reader protocols use the query phase for discovering a recent record with the
label ‘fin’ as its metadata (line 14). During the pre-write phase of write operations (line 16), the
writer makes sure that at least a quorum of servers, say Qpw, store each a coded element with the
tag t′ and label ‘pre’. Note that immediately at the end of the prewrite phase, the stored record
cannot be accessed by the readers, because when a server replies to queries considers only records
with finalized tags (line 14). However, after the prewrite phase, the writer starts the finalize phase
(line 5 and 19), which diffuses the records with the label ‘fin’ and the tag t′ and then waits for a
quorum of servers, say Qfw, to reply. Immediately after this finalized phase, any query phase (of
any read or write operation) will retrieve a tag that is at least as high as t′ (because by Lemma 3.2
it holds that Qpw and Qfw must interest) and in that sense tag t
′ is viable to all clients. Moreover,
the existence a stored record that its label is ‘fin’ implies that the coded elements associated tag
t′ are stored by at least a quorum of servers, which is Qpw. This property allows the reader to
retrieve at least kthreshold unique coded elements (line 42 to 11), which are stored at the servers
of Qpw. Cadambe et al. [12] set the value of kthreshold to k (whereas we consider another value
in Section 4). We also note that the reader further facilitates the diffusion of finalized tags to a
quorum (line 9). This and the gossip messages (line 32) allows the system to complete the diffusion
of finalized records in the presence of fail-stop failures of writers.
Corollary 3.3 ([12], Theorem 1). Algorithm 1 emulates a shared atomic read/write memory.
4 Basic Results
We present a variance that adds privacy provision to the implementation proposed by Cadambe et
al. [12]. Our variation allows at most e malicious servers and at most f failures in an asynchronous
message-passing system. In this section, we consider malicious servers can send corrupted secret
shares to readers, but not corrupted tags or labels, i.e., when a malicious server replies with a tuple
(t, w, d), only w might be corrupted. Writers divide secrets and submit the resulting secret shares
to the servers. Servers store their secret shares and deliver them to the readers upon request. In
sections 5 to 11, we extend our proposal to withstand fail-stop failures and server malicious behavior
to also consider recovery after the occurrence of transient faults.
4.1 Using (m, k) MDS codes for secret sharing
The (N, k)-MDS code enables the reader to restore the data under the presence of N−k2 stop-failed
servers. The (N, k)-threshold scheme for integers k and N , such that 0 < k ≤ N , is defined by
Shamir [45] and splits a secret s into N secret shares {si}i∈{1,...,N}. This scheme requires that there
exists a mapping from any S ⊆ {si}i∈{1,...,N} with |S| ≥ k to the secret s, but it is impossible to
determine s from a set of less than k secret shares.
Let K be a finite field, such that its size |K| is a prime number. The (N, k)-Reed-Solomon code,
Φ : S → W, transforms the input data, i.e., one element of a k dimensional vector space, S, over K,
into N dimensional vector space, W, over the same field, K, where k and N are as above. We call
N the block length and k the message length. The Berlekamp-Welch algorithm, Φ−1, can correct
(N, k)-Reed-Solomon codes within O(N3) time in the presence of e errors and f erasures, as long as
2e+ f < N − k+ 1 [48], as described by Gemmell and Sudan [30]. Note that (N, k)-Reed-Solomon
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codes are a (N, k)-threshold scheme [41]. To that end, the input vector (σ1, . . . , σk) ∈ S consists of
the secret σ1 and randomly chosen values σ2, . . . , σk from a uniform distribution over S. We use Φ
to map (σ1, . . . , σk) to the secret shares (w1, . . . , wN ) ∈ W.
4.2 Quorums of (k+2e)-overlap
We require that any quorum Q ∈ Q has at least dN+k+2e2 e servers. Lemma 4.1 uses the quorum
definition to shows that any two different quorums share at least k+ 2e servers, rather than just k
of them as in Cadambe et al. [12]. These quorums guarantee that once a writer finishes its write
operation, any reader can retrieve at least k + 2e secret shares and reconstruct the secret. The
lemma also shows, similar to Cadambe et al. [12], that any two different quorums share at least
k + 2e servers. This guarantees that after a writer wrote to a quorum, the readers can read a set
of coded elements that allows the secret reconstruction.
Lemma 4.1 (Variation of [12], Lemma 5.1). Suppose that k ∈ {1 . . . , N − 2(f + e)}. (1) If
Q1, Q2 ∈ Q, then |Q1 ∩Q2| ≥ k+ 2e. (2) The existence of such a k implies the existence of Q ∈ Q
such that Q has no crashed servers.
Proof. (1) Let Q1, Q2 ∈ Q, then |Q1 ∩Q2| = |Q1|+ |Q2| − |Q1 ∪Q2| ≥ 2
⌈
N+k+2e
2
⌉−N ≥ k + 2e.
(2) Since there are at most f crashed servers, we can show that without such f servers, there are
still enough alive servers for a quorum. It follows that N − f ≥ N − ⌊N−k−2e2 ⌋ = ⌈N+k+2e2 ⌉ .
By Lemma 4.1, the atomicity and liveness analysis in [12, Theorem 5.2 to Lemma 5.9] also holds
when Algorithm 1 uses (k + 2e)-overlap quorums rather than k, as Cadambe et al. [12] indented.
4.3 Privacy preserving variation of Cadambe et al.
We say that a secret sharing protocol is t-private when a set of at most t servers cannot compute
the secret, as in [6]. Note that a 0-private protocol preserves no privacy. When the presence of at
most s failing servers (which do not deviate from the algorithm behavior) and at most t malicious
servers (which deviate from the algorithm behavior only by modifying the data filed of their replies
to the clients), we say that the protocol is (s, t)-robust. This notion is similar to t-resilience [6].
In order to tolerate at most e (secret share corruptions made by) malicious servers, we propose
Algorithm 1 as a variation of Cadambe et al. [12] CAS algorithm that uses (k+2e)-overlap quorums
and (N, k)-Reed-Solomon codes [42], which is an (N, k)-MDS [43] code that Cadambe et al. [12]
uses. By the atomicity and liveness analysis for the case of (k + 2e)-overlap quorums (the remark
after Lemma 4.1), the reader retrieves k + 2e unique secret shares with at most e manipulated
shares.
4.3.1 Robustness
Robustness is added by the ability of the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm to correct errors in the Reed-
Solomon codes. Note that malicious servers only introduce corrupted secret shares. Lemma 4.2
shows Algorithm 1’s resilience against up to e malicious servers and up to f stop-failed servers.
Lemma 4.2. For k ∈ {1 . . . , N − 2(f + e)}, Algorithm 1 is (f, e)-robust.
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Proof. If a writer issues a query, pre-write and finalize operations it does not retrieve the secret
from the server. Thus, writers are immune to malicious servers. Servers do not exchange secrets
with other servers and thus are not directly affected by malicious servers.
The rest of the proof focuses on showing that when reconstructing the secret, the read operation
pir is able to be resilient against corrupted secret shares that malicious nodes may send. To do this,
the reader queries all the servers about the maximal finalized tags and wait for a response from at
least a quorum of servers. Algorithm 1 selects the maximum tag, t, for the returned set of tags.
This tag t is uniquely associated to a write that reached the finalize phase before pir’s query. The
read operation pir then sends a finalize command on its own and waits for a quorum of servers to
respond. Note that the reader merely collects secret shares from a quorum of servers, but never
update coded elements that the servers stores, since pir’s query and finalize records only contains
a ⊥ in place of the coded elements, which are the secret shares. By Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 3.3,
it follows that any reader pi receives at least k + 2e secret shares from the finalize phase. Out of
these k + 2e secret shares, at most e might be corrupted. This is the case even if up to f server
are failing. Therefore, the reader can decode the secret from this collection of k + 2e responses by
applying the Berlekamp-Welch error-correction algorithm [48].
4.3.2 Privacy
Our approach ensures the privacy of the secret among servers. Lemma 4.3 shows that a group of
less than k servers are not able to reconstruct the secret by combining the secret shares they have
stored locally.
Lemma 4.3. For k ∈ {1 . . . , N − 2(f + e)}, Algorithm 1 is (k − 1)-private.
Proof. Let t be a tag and k > 1. A set of k− 1 servers store together k− 1 secret shares associated
with the tag t. Since the secret shares encode a secret using Reed-Solomon codes, it is impossible
to compute the original secret with less than k secret shares [41]. The case of k = 1 implies that the
secret shares are the secret itself and, thus, privacy is compromised, i.e., it is 0-private. It follows
that Algorithm 1 is (k − 1)-private.
Note that in the case of k = 1, even if privacy is not protected, it is still possible to decipher
correctly corrupted secret shares. This holds because the reader blocks until it reads at least 1 + 2e
secret shares and, thus, the additional 2e secret shares contain redundant information that allows
the success of the Berlekamp-Welch code for error correction.
5 Models
We consider an asynchronous message-passing networks in which the nodes can be modeled as finite
state-machines that exchange messages via communication links (with bounded capacity).
5.1 Communication model
The network topology is of a fully-connected graph, KN , and any pair of nodes has access to a
bidirectional communication channel that, at any time, has at most capacity ∈ N packets. Every
two nodes exchange (low-level messages called) packets to permit delivery of (high level) messages.
When node pi ∈ P sends a packet, m, to node pj ∈ P \{pi}, the operation send inserts a copy of m
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to channel i,j , while respecting the upper bound capacity on the number of packets in the channel. In
case channel i,j is full, i.e., |channel i,j | = capacity, the sending-side simply overwrites any message
in channel i,j . When pj receives m from pi, the system removes m from channel i,j . As long as
m ∈ channel i,j , we say that m’s message is in transit from pi to pj . Recall that we assume access to
a self-stabilizing end-to-end protocol [15, 22] that provides reliable (FIFO) message delivery (over
unreliable non-FIFO channels that are subject to packet omissions, reordering and duplication).
5.2 Execution model
Our analysis considers the interleaving model [14], in which the node’s program is a sequence of
(atomic) steps. Each step starts with an internal computation and finishes with a single communi-
cation operation, i.e., message send or receive.
The state, si, of pi ∈ P includes all of pi’s variables as well as the set of all incoming commu-
nication channels. Note that pi’s step can change si as well as remove a message from channelj,i
(upon message arrival) or add a message in channeli,j (when a message is sent). The term system
state refers to a tuple of the form c = (s1, s2, · · · , sN ) (system configuration), where each si is pi’s
state (including messages in transit to pi). We define an execution (or run) R = c0, a0, c1, a1, . . . as
an alternating sequence of system states cx and steps ax, such that each system state cx+1, except
for the starting one, c0, is obtained from the preceding system state cx by the execution of step ax.
Let R′ and R′′ be a prefix, and respectively, a suffix of R, such that R′ is finite sequence, which
starts with a system state and ends with a step ax ∈ R′, and R′′ is an unbounded sequence, which
starts in the system state that immediately follows step ax in R. In this case, we can use ◦ as the
operator to denote that R = R′ ◦R′′ concatenates R′ with R′′.
5.3 Fault model
We model a failure as a step that the environment takes rather than the algorithm. We consider
failures that can and cannot cause the system to deviate from fulfilling its task (Figure 2). The set
of legal executions (LE) refers to all the executions in which the requirements of the task T hold.
For example, TCAS(k) denotes our studied task of shared memory emulation and LECAS(k) denotes
the set of executions in which the system fulfills TCAS(k)’s requirements. We say that a system state
c is legitimate when every execution R that starts from c is in LE. When a failure cannot cause
the system execution (that starts in a legitimate state) to leave the set LE, we refer to that failure
as a benign one. We consider failures that can cause the system execution to leave the set LE as
transient faults, which refer to any temporary violation of the assumptions according to which the
system was designed to operate (as long as program code remains intact). Self-stabilizing algorithms
deals with benign failures (while fulfilling the task requirements) and they can also recover after
the occurrence of transient faults within a bounded period.
5.3.1 Benign failures
The algorithmic solutions that we consider are for asynchronous (message-passing) systems and
thus they are oblivious to the time in which the packets arrive and departure (and require no
explicit access to clock-based mechanisms, which may or may not be used by the system underlying
mechanisms, say, for congestion control at the end-to-end protocol).
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assumptions 
Fair execution Arbitrary execution
Transient 
faults
Transient faults: any combination of failures (assuming the 
code stays intact); causes an arbitrary starting state 
Benign 
failures Asynchrony in the presence of fail-stops failures
Packet failures: omission, duplication and reordering (assuming communication fairness holds)
Legal executionRecovery periodExecution starting state
Figure 2: The fault model and liveness assumptions during the system execution.
Communication fairness. Recall that we assume that the communication channel handles
packet failures, such as omission, duplication, reordering (Section 5.1). We assume that if pi sends
a message infinitely often to pj , node pj receives that message infinitely often. We call the latter the
fair communication assumption. Note that fair communication provides no bound on the channel
communication delays. It merely says that a message is received within some finite time if its sender
does not stop sending it (until it receives the acknowledgment message).
Node failure. We assume that the failure of node pi ∈ P implies that its hosted client and
server stop sending and receiving messages (and it also stops executing all other steps). We assume
that the number of nodes that host servers and fail is bounded by f and that 2f < N for the sake of
guaranteeing correctness [39]. We bound only by N the number of nodes that host clients and fail.
Moreover, nodes that host servers resume within some unknown finite time and reset the server
state machines by removing all stored records. However, nodes that host clients do not resume (or
allow the invocation) any client process until they call a procedure that we name localReset(). (We
specify how a global reset mechanism uses this procedure in Section 6.2. Moreover, Section 12.1
provides an elegant extension that lets nodes to recycle their client identifiers and thus the above
assumption is not restrictive.)
5.3.2 Transient faults
We consider arbitrary violations of the assumptions according to which the system and the com-
munication network design to operate. We refer to these violations and deviations as transient
faults and assume that they can corrupt the system state arbitrarily (while keeping the program
code intact). We preserve the occurrence of transient faults as an extremely rare event. Our model
assumes that the last transient fault occurred before the system execution started. Moreover, it
left the system to start in an arbitrary state (while keeping the program code intact).
5.4 Dijkstra’s self-stabilization criterion
An algorithm is self-stabilizing with relation to the task LE, when every (unbounded) execution
R of the algorithm reaches within a bounded period a suffix Rlegal ∈ LE that is legal. That
is, Dijkstra [13] requires that ∀R : ∃R′ : R = R′ ◦ Rlegal ∧ Rlegal ∈ LE, where the length of R′ is
polynomial in n. We say that a system execution is fair when every step that is applicable infinitely
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often is executed infinitely often and fair communication is kept. Self-stabilizing algorithms often
assume that R is a fair execution. Wait-free algorithms guarantee that non-failing operations always
become (within a finite number of steps) complete even in the presence of benign failures. Note
that fair executions do not consider fail-stop failures (that were not detected by the system whom
then excluded these failing nodes from reentering the system). Therefore, we cannot demonstrate
that an algorithm is wait-free by assuming that the system execution is always fair.
5.5 Self-stabilization in the presence of seldom fairness
As a variation of Dijkstra’s self-stabilization criterion, we propose design criteria in which (i) any
execution R = RrecoveryPeriod ◦ R′ : R′ ∈ LE, which starts in an arbitrary execution and has
a prefix (RrecoveryPeriod) that is fair, reaches a legitimate system state within a bounded prefix
RrecoveryPeriod. (Note that the legal suffix R
′ is not required to be fair.) Moreover, (ii) any execution
R = R′′ ◦ RglobalReset ◦ R′′′ ◦ RglobalReset ◦ . . . : R′′, R′′′ ∈ LE in which the prefix of R is legal, and
not necessarily fair but includes at most O(N · zmax) (Section 2.2.4) write operations, has a suffix,
RglobalReset ◦R′′′ ◦RglobalReset ◦ . . ., such that RglobalReset is required to be fair and bounded in length
but might permit the violation of liveness requirements, i.e., a bounded number of operations might
be aborted (as long as the safety requirement holds). Furthermore, R′′′ is legal and not necessarily
fair but includes at least zmax write operations before the system reaches another RglobalReset. Since
we can choose zmax ∈ Z+ to be a very large value, say 264, and the occurrence of transient faults is
very rare, we refer to the proposed criteria as one for self-stabilizing systems that their executions
fairness is unrequited except for seldom periods. Next, we define how we bound the length of
RrecoveryPeriod and RglobalReset, which are the complexity measures.
5.6 Complexity Measures
The main complexity measure of self-stabilizing systems is the time it takes the system to recover
after the occurrence of a last transient fault. In detail, in the presence of seldom fairness this com-
plexity measure considers the maximum of two values: (i) the maximum length of RrecoveryPeriod,
which is the period during which the system recovers after the occurrence of transient failures,
and (ii) the maximum length of RglobalReset. We consider systems that use of bounded memory
and thus this is a secondary complexity measure we bound the memory that each node needs to
have (after considering a version that does not consider such bounds, as in Cadambe et al. [12]).
However, the number of messages sent during an execution does not have an immediate relevance
in the context of self-stabilization, because self-stabilizing systems never stop sending messages [14,
Chapter 3.3]. Next, we present the definitions, notations and assumptions related to the main
complexity measure.
5.6.1 Message round-trips
Let c ∈ R be a state, such that immediately after c, node pi sends a message m to pj . Moreover,
immediately after c′ (that follows c), pj receives message m (or a message that was sent from pi
to pj after m) and sends a response message rm back to pi. Then, immediately after state c
′′ ∈ R
(that appears after c′ in R), pi receives pj ’s response, rm (or a response that was sent from pj to
pi after rm). If c, c
′ and c′′ do appear in R, we say that pi has completed with pj a round-trip of
message m.
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5.6.2 Completing client rounds
A call to a client procedure results in a number of requests that the client sends to all servers and
then waits for the server responses. The client may decide not to wait for responses from all servers
and continue to the request for the next phase or reach the end of the procedure execution. We say
that a client starts a new round when, after a finite period of internal computation, it sends the
first request (of any phase) to the servers. Moreover, this client ends this round when it finished
waiting for the server responses (and perhaps also reaches the procedure end; regardless of whether
it enters branches). The client at node pi performs a complete round when it starts a new round
in cstart ∈ R and ends it in cend ∈ R.
We are also interested in the cases of incomplete operations, which do not have necessarily a
proper start to their first round. In this case, we say that the client at node pi completes a round
when it reaches cend ∈ R. Note that whenever pi does not fail, cend is well-defined, because it refers
to the case in which pi stops waiting for the server responses and move on (to the next phase or
reaching the end of the client procedure). For the case in which pi fails, we define cend to be the
system state that immediately follows the step in which pi fails.
5.6.3 Complete node and server iterations
Recall the fact that self-stabilizing algorithms can never stop communicating [14, Chapter 3.3].
The program of a self-stabilizing algorithm often includes a do-forever loop or, as in case of the
proposed algorithm, a repeated gossip exchange among the servers. Next, we define the terms
complete iterations, which refers to such gossip exchanges.
Node complete iterations. Let P (i) ⊆ P be the set of nodes with whom pi completes a
message round trip infinitely often in R. Suppose that immediately after the system state cstart ∈ R,
node pi takes a step that includes the execution of the first line of the do forever loop (or of the
gossip procedure), and immediately after system state cend ∈ R, it holds that: (i) pi had finished
the iteration that it had started in cbegin (regardless of whether it enters branches), and (ii) the
message mj completes its round trip, where mj refer to any message that pi sends during that
iteration to node pj ∈ P (i). In this case, we say that pi’s iteration starts at cbegin and ends at cend.
Server complete iterations. The servers repeatedly receive messages from all other non-failing
servers and then, after some internal processing, send messages to all other servers. The successful
arrival of such a message to any server results again in some internal processing and then sending
messages to all other servers. We say that: (i) the iteration of the server at pi ∈ P starts when pi
first gets a message from another server, (ii) after some internal processing, pi sends a message to
every other server at pj , (iii) this iteration continues toward letting pj to receive that message (or
a later message) from pi; at least once, and then (iv) letting pj ’s responds (or a later message from
pj) to arrive to pi and by that ending this server iteration. Given an execution R, we say that its
prefix R′ includes a complete iteration of the server at pi ∈ P if R′ includes pi’s iteration start and
then (after that start) and pi’s iteration end appears in R
′.
5.6.4 Asynchronous cycles
We measure the time between two system states in a fair execution by the number of (asynchronous)
cycles between them. The definition of (asynchronous) cycles considers the term of complete
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iterations. The first (asynchronous) cycle (with round-trips) of fair execution R = R′′ ◦ R′′′ is the
shortest prefix R′′ of R, such that each non-failing node and server in the network executes at least
one complete iteration in R′′, where ◦ is the concatenation operator (Section 5.2). Moreover, each
node that runs a client procedure during R′′ must complete within R′′ at least one client round.
The second cycle in execution R is the first cycle in execution R′′, and so on.
6 External Building Blocks
The proposed algorithm uses a number of external building blocks, which we specify next.
6.1 Specifications of gossip and quorum services
We consider a gossip functionality that has the following interface. Servers can send gossip messages
msg by calling gossip(msg). When a gossip message arrives, the receiving server raises the gossip
arrival event with a set {gossip[k]}pk∈P that includes the most recently received message from
every server. For the sake of simple presentation, we allow the server at node pi to use the item
gossip[i] for aggregating the gossip information that it later gossips to all other servers. The gossip
functionality that we consider guarantees the following: (a) every gossip message that the receiver
delivers to its upper layer was indeed sent by the sender, and (b) such deliveries occur according
to the communication fairness guarantees (Section 5.3.1). That is, our gossip service is unreliable,
as opposed to the one used by Cadambe et al. [12].
We consider a system in which the clients and servers behave according to the following terms
of service. At any time, any node runs only at most one client (that is either a writer or a
reader). That client calls the function qrmAccess() sequentially. Moreover, the server algorithm
acknowledges (by calling reply()) every request. For this client-server behavior, the quorum-based
communication functionality guarantees the following. (a) At least a quorum of servers receive,
deliver and acknowledge every request. (b) The (non-failing) requesting client receives at least a
quorum of these acknowledgments. (c) Immediately before the call to qrmAccess() returns, the
client-side of this service clears its state from information related to the request. For the sake of
simple presentation, we allow the client to call qrmAccess(msg) with two kinds of parameters; msg
is either a single message to be sent to all servers, such as in the case of a query request, or a vector
that includes an individual message for each server, such as in the case of a prewrite request.
We detail the above requirements in Definition 6.1 and use Corollary 6.2 in the correctness proof
of the proposed algorithm. (Section 13 of the Appendix presents a self-stabilizing implementation
of such services, which we do not include here since it is not a major contribution.)
Definition 6.1 (Legal execution of the gossip and quorum services). Let R be an execution
of the algorithm that provides gossip and quorum services in which there is a client at pi ∈ P, a
server at pj ∈ P and another server at pk ∈ P.
• Correct behavior of the gossip functionality. Suppose that (1) every message that pk
delivers to the upper layer as a gossip from pj was indeed sent by pj earlier in R. Moreover,
(2) such deliveries occur infinitely often in R. In this case, we say that the behavior of the
gossip functionality from the server at pj to the one at pk is correct.
• Terms of service for the quorum-based communication functionality. Suppose
that in R, at any time, any node runs only at most one client (that is either a writer or a
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reader). Moreover, that client calls the function qrmAccess() sequentially, i.e., only after the
return from qrmAccess() may the client call qrmAccess() again. Furthermore, suppose that
the server algorithm acknowledges (by calling reply()) every request that was delivered to it.
In this case, we say that R satisfies the terms of service of the quorum-based communication
functionality.
• Correct behavior of the quorum-based communication functionality. Suppose that
the client at pi sends a request, i.e., pi calls the function qrmAccess() in step aqrmAccess ∈ R.
Moreover, after aqrmAccess, execution R includes steps (i) to (v), where (i) refers to the steps
in R in which at least a quorum of servers receive aqrmAccess’s request, (ii) refers to steps in
R in which at least a quorum delivers aqrmAccess’s request, (iii) refers to steps in R in which
at least a quorum acknowledges aqrmAccess’s request and (iv) refers to steps in R in which the
client at pi receives at least a quorum of these acknowledgments to aqrmAccess’s request, which
results in (v) a step in R in which pi lets the function (which pi had previously called in step
aqrmAccess) to return. Furthermore, any such return is only the result of the above sequence
of steps (i) to (v). In this case, we say that the functionality of quorum-based communication
is correct. In addition, immediately before the call to qrmAccess() returns, the client-side of
this service clear its state from information related to the request.
• A legal execution of gossip and quorum services. Let R′ and R′′ be a prefix, and
respectively, a suffix of R, such that R = R′◦R′′ is an execution of gossip and quorum services
that satisfies the terms of service of the quorum-based communication functionality. We say
that R′′ is legal when it presents: (1) a correct gossip functionality from the server at pj to
the server at pk, and (2) a correct functionality of quorum-based communication with respect
to the client at pj.
Corollary 6.2 (Self-stabilizing gossip and quorum-based communications). Let R be an Algo-
rithm 3’s (unbounded) execution that satisfies the terms of service of the quorum-based communi-
cation functionality. Suppose that R is fair and its starting system state is arbitrary. Within O(1)
asynchronous cycles, R reaches a suffix R′ in which (1) the gossip, and (2) the quorum-based com-
munication functionalities are correct. (3) During R′, the gossip and quorum-based communication
complete correctly their operations within O(1) asynchronous cycles.
6.2 Self-stabilizing Global Reset
The proposed algorithm uses the reset mechanism for dealing with the case in which the system
includes a tag of (zmax, j) : pj ∈ P (Section 2.2.4). We note that the reset mechanism requires the
participation of all the nodes in the network, i.e., they require execution fairness (Section 5.4). We
specify the interface between the proposed algorithm and the self-stabilizing global reset mechanism.
6.2.1 The localReset() and globalReset() functions
During an execution that is legal (with respect to the reset mechanism), the self-stabilizing global
reset process starts when any node, which we refer to as the (reset) initiator, calls the globalReset(t)
function; concurrent calls are allowed. The reset mechanism lets every pair of nodes to exchange
messages infinitely often so that it can make sure that all nodes complete the different phases of
the reset process, which starts immediately after the first call to globalReset(). In the first phase,
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all client and server processes are disabled and each node calls the function localReset(). In the
second phase, these processes are enabled, the reset process ends and the system resumes normal
operation.
We assume that every machine, such as a server or a client, implements the function localRe-
set(t). For the case of the servers, this local reset procedure removes any record from the server
storage other than the ones with the tag t and then replaces the tag t = (z, k) in that record with
the tag (1, k). Note that when t = t0 (Section 2.1), no record is kept in the server storage. For the
case clients, the call to localReset(t) simply stops any client operation and the ignores the argument
t. The requirements below specify the set of legal executions. Note that the system has to reach
a safe system state even when no global reset was (properly) initialized, e.g., no node has called
globalReset(), but still, some nodes are performing reset due to transient faults.
6.2.2 Requirements
Within a bounded number of asynchronous cycles from the first step in R that includes a call to
globalReset(t), the reset service disables all hosted processes, which are the servers and clients,
and resets these processes by calling their localReset(t) functions, which abort all read and write
operations. Moreover, every node cleans its incoming and outgoing channels, e.g., it fills these
channels with reset messages so that non-reset-related messages are absent from these channels, as
in [14] Chapter 3.2. (By reset messages we mean messages that their type is only used by the reset
mechanism.) Then, the reset mechanism enables every (local) machine.
We further require the following. We say that a given system state is reset-free when all com-
munication channels do not include reset-related messages, and all machines (clients and servers)
are enabled. Given execution R of the system, we say that R does not include an explicit reset
when throughout R no node pi ∈ P calls globalReset(). Suppose that execution R does not include
an explicit reset and that all of its system states are reset-free. In this case we say that R does not
include a spontaneous reset. An execution R that does not contain neither a spontaneous reset, nor
an explicit reset, is reset-free. When execution R does include (a spontaneous or an explicit) reset,
we require R to be done with reset within a bounded number of Ψ asynchronous cycles. Namely,
(starting from an arbitrary system state) within Ψ asynchronous cycles, the system reaches a system
state after which the execution is reset-free.
6.2.3 Possible implementations
The proposed algorithm uses a self-stabilizing global reset mechanism that resembles the one in [5].
Another way to go is to use a self-stabilizing consensus algorithm [7]. Since similar mechanisms
exist and they are not hard to extend so that the above specifications are met, we do not consider
the algorithm for implementing the specified mechanism for self-stabilizing global reset to be within
the scope of this work.
7 An Unbounded Self-stabilizing CAS Algorithm
This paper presents a self-stabilizing algorithm that uses a bounded amount of memory. For the
sake of presentation simplicity, we start by presenting a self-stabilizing algorithm that has no such
bounds as a ‘first attempt’. We then prove the correctness of the unbounded algorithm (Section 8)
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Algorithm 2: Private and Self-Stabilization CAS Algorithm, code for pi’s client and server.
34 The client: /* At any time, pi’s client is a writer, a reader or none but not both */
35 writer(s): /* Store the secret s as a new version of the shared object */
/* Query for finalized tags and after hearing from a quorum get the maximal tag */
36 let (z, j) := max({t′ : (t′, •) ∈ qrmAccess((⊥,⊥, ‘qry’))})
37 qrmAccess(((z + 1, i), {Φpj (s)}pj∈P , ‘pre’)); /* Prewrite and wait for a quorum of replies */
38 qrmAccess(((z + 1, i),⊥, ‘fin’)); /* Finalize and wait for a quorum of replies */
39 qrmAccess(((z + 1, i),⊥, ‘FIN’)); /* FINALIZE and wait for a quorum of replies */
40 return;
41 reader(): ; /* The reader retrieves the current object version, or ⊥ upon failure */
42 let t := max({t′ : (t′, •) ∈ qrmAccess((⊥,⊥, ‘qry’))}) ; /* Query as in line 42 */
43 let Q := qrmAccess((t,⊥, ‘fin’)); /* Ask and wait for finalized records from a quorum */
44 if |{(t, w, ‘fin’) ∈ Q : w 6= ⊥}|  kthreshold then return ⊥; /* Test the number of responces */
45 else return(Φ−1(w : {(t, w, s) ∈ Q : w 6= ⊥})); /* Use the retrived shares for decoding */
46 The server:
47 S ⊂ T × (W ∪ {⊥})×D is a record set, where T = Z × P is the set of tags, W the set of coded words and
D = {‘pre’, ‘fin’, ‘FIN’} the set of phases. When S = ∅, we use the default triple (t0, wt0,i, ‘fin’) when
reporting on the triple with the highest locally known tag;
48 Event handlers at the server:
49 upon query arrival from pj ’s client to pi’s server do
50 if pj’s client is a reader then reply(j, (maxPhase(D \ {‘pre’}),⊥, ‘qry’));
51 else reply(j, (maxPhase(D),⊥, ‘qry’));
52 upon pre-write (t, w, ‘pre’) arrival from the pj ’s writer to pi’s server do
53 updatePhase(t, w, ‘pre’);
54 reply(j, (t,⊥, ‘pre’));
55 upon finalize or FINALIZE m := (t,⊥, d) : d ∈ (D \ {‘pre’}) arrival from pj ’s client to pi’s server do
56 updatePhase(t,⊥, d);
57 if ∃s := (t, w, d) ∈ S and pj’s client is a reader then reply(j, (t, w, d)) else reply(j, (t,⊥, d));
58 upon gossip {(pre[k], fin[k], F IN [k]) = gossip[k]}pk∈P arrival from pj ’s server to pi’s server do
59 pre[i]← max({pre[k], fin[k], F IN [k]}pk∈P ∪ {maxPhase(D)});
60 updatePhase(pre[i],⊥, ‘pre’);
61 fin[i]← max({fin[k], F IN [k]}pk∈P ∪ {maxPhase(D \ {‘pre’})});
62 updatePhase(fin[i],⊥, ‘fin’);
63 FIN [i]← max({FIN [k]}pk∈P ∪ {maxPhase({‘FIN’})}) ∪ {t ∈ T : {pk ∈ P : fin[k] = t} ∈ Q};
64 updatePhase(FIN [i],⊥, ‘FIN’);
65 gossip(tagTuple());
66 Local functions at the server:
67 function maxPhase(phs) do return max({t : (t, •, p) ∈ (S ∪ {(t0, w0,i, ‘fin’)}) ∧ p ∈ phs})
68 function tagTuple() do return (maxPhase(D),maxPhase(D \ {‘pre’}),maxPhase({‘FIN’}));
69 function updatePhase(t, w, u) do {if ∃s := (t, w′, c) ∈ S ∧ w′ 6= ⊥ ∧ w = ⊥ then S ← (S \ {s})∪
{(t, w′, p)}), where p := upgradePhase(c, u) else S ← ((S \ {(t, •)}) ∪ {(t, w, u)})};
70 function upgradePhase(old, new) do switch (old, new) :
71 case(‘pre’, ‘fin’): return ‘fin’; case(‘fin’, ‘FIN’): return ‘FIN’; default return old;
before bounding the amount of storage needed (Section 9) and as well as the number of possible
tag values (Section 10).
One of the key differences between self-stabilizing algorithms to non-self-stabilizing algorithms
is that, due to a transient fault, the self-stabilizing system can start in a state c that the non-
self-stabilizing system can never reach. For example, in c a single server may include a record
with a finalized tag t for which there is no quorum of servers that store records that include coded
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elements relevant to t. Due to the asynchronous nature of the system, we cannot bound the number
of write operations that the system will take until at least one write operation install its records
on all servers. Similar examples can be found when considering pre-write records. We propose
to overcome this challenge by letting the gossip server to exchanges message that includes that
maximal tag values for each phase.
There is no self-stabilizing algorithm for end-to-end communication when there are no bound
on the capacity of the communication channels [14, Chapter 3]. Cadambe et al. [12] assume
that all communication channels are reliable and cannot lose messages. We are not aware of a
straightforward manner in which we can assume that these communication channels are both of
bounded capacity and self-stabilizing, because the asynchronous nature of the system implies that
there is no bound on the number of write operations that the system may finish before a given
server receives a single gossip message. Therefore, we let the gossip service to repeatedly exchange
among the servers their maximal tag values. This way, the servers get to know eventually about
the highest tag values.
With these modifications in mind, we note that the client part of Algorithm 2 follows similar
lines as the ones of Algorithm 1 with the following notable differences. The prewrite phase (line 37)
associates the operation with the tag (z+1, i), where t = (z, •) is the maximal prewrite tag returned
from the query phase (line 36). Moreover, Algorithm 2 uses an additional finalized phase (line 39),
which we refer to as FINALIZED. This phase helps the algorithm to assure that every complete
write operation with tag t has at least a quorum of servers with a finalized tag t.
The server part of Algorithm 2 also implements the above modifications. The notable changes,
with respect to Algorithm 1, include the following. Servers reply to queries from readers with the
highest local finalized tag (line 51) whereas for the case of writers all local tags are considered
(line 50). Also, upon gossip arrival (line 58), the server processes all the gossip messages that
have recently arrived for all servers. It first calculates the local maximal prewrite tag (lines 59
and 60), then the local maximal finalized tag (lines 61 and 62) before considering the FINALIZED
one (lines 63 and 64) and then sending an updated gossip message (line 65). Note that each server
stores the highest tag that it has heard from each phase. Moreover, when a server discovers that
it knows about a quorum of servers that store each a finalized record with tag t, it updates that
record to have the FINALIZED phase (line 63). This way, an implicit FINALIZED record becomes
explicitly FINALIZED.
8 Correctness Proof of our Self-stabilizing CAS Algorithm
After the preliminaries (Section 8.1), we study basic properties of Algorithm 2 (Section 8.2) be-
fore showing its ability to recover after the occurrence of transient-faults (Section 8.3). We then
demonstrate the atomicity (Section 8.4) and liveness (Section 8.5) of Algorithm 2.
8.1 Notation and definitions
We refer to the values of variable X at node pi as Xi, i.e., the variable name with a subscript that
indicates the node identifier. We denote to the storage variable, S, of pi as Spi due to its centrality
to the system state. Let R be an execution, c ∈ R a system state and pi ∈ P a node that executes
the function f() in a step a ∈ R that appears in R immediately after c. We denote by fa() the
value that returns from f()’s execution during step a.
24
Draft
Each client procedure includes a finite sequence of requests that the client sends to the servers,
where the responses received from one request to the servers are used for forming the next request
to the servers. We associate each invocation of the client procedures with an operation pi that
includes all of its steps in R (either at the client or the servers) in which a node sends or receives
messages due to pi’s invocation of the client procedure. Definition 8.1 classifies operations by the
way they start and end.
Definition 8.1 (Classifying operations by their start and end). Let R be the algorithm
execution with pi as a client operation. Denote by cstart(pi) ∈ R the system state that is followed
immediately by step astart(pi) that starts pi. Moreover, cend(pi) denotes the system state that follows
immediately after a step aend(pi) that ends pi. We characterize pi’s behavior in R in the following
manner.
• Incomplete operations. Suppose that pi’s first step, astart(pi), does not include the exe-
cution of the first line of the pi’s (write or read) procedure (lines 36, and respectively, 42). In
this case, we say that pi is incomplete in R. We say that a client request or a server reply is
incomplete if it is part of an incomplete operation (due to stale information that appear in an
arbitrary starting system state). Note that the expression “operation pi is complete in suffix
R′′ of R = R′ ◦R′′ refers to the case in which astart(pi) ∈ R′ and aend(pi) ∈ R′′.
• Failed operations. Suppose that pi’s last step, aend(pi), does not include the execution of
the last line of the pi’s (read or write) procedure. In this case, we say that pi fails in R.
• Complete operations. Suppose that pi is eventually neither incomplete nor failed in R.
In this case, we say that pi is complete in R. Before the end of a given complete operation,
we refer to it as an on-going operation.
8.2 Basic Properties of Algorithm 2
Lemma 8.2 (Algorithm 2’s progression). Algorithm 2’s operations, whether they are failed,
incomplete or complete, end within O(1) asynchronous cycles in any fair execution of Algorithm 2,
which may start in any system state.
Proof. The server part of Algorithm 2 includes only non-blocking responses to Algorithm 2’s re-
quests. Thus, Algorithm 2’s termination depends on the termination of each client phase. We,
therefore, prove that every client phase ends eventually.
The query, pre-write and finalize phases (of readers and writers) terminate. We start
by showing that at least a quorum of query responses arrive to every non-failing client (lines 36
and 42). The proof uses parts (2) and (3) of Corollary 6.2 for showing the correct functionality
of quorum-based communication in R (Section 6.1) as long as the system satisfies the terms of
service of the quorum-based communication functionality. To that end, we need to show that: (i)
only the client calls the function qrmAccess() and it does so sequentially, as well as (ii) the server
algorithm acknowledges (by calling reply(), Section 6.1) requests that were delivered to it. From
Section 2.1 and Algorithm 2, we observe that: (i.a) any node run at most one client that is either
a writer or a reader, (i.b) only the clients call the function qrmAccess(), (i.c) there is only one
client (either reader or writer) per node, and (i.d) that client does not calls qrmAccess() before
the previous call returns. We also note that (ii) the server pseudo-code (Algorithm 2) includes a
response for every client request. In detail, any non-failing server, say, the one at node pj ∈ P,
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replies to queries that pi delivers to it with the message ((⊥,⊥, ‘qry’), (t,⊥, ‘qry’)) (line 49), where
(t, •, ‘fin’) ∈ Spi and t is Spi ’s highest finalized local tag. Note that whenever Spi = ∅, the server
at pi considers the tuple (t0,⊥, ‘qry’) (line 47), and thus the server at pj always replies to queries.
From (i.a), (i.b), (i.c), (i.d) and (ii) we get that the functionality of quorum-based communication
is correct eventually even when starting from any system state, because the conditions of parts (2)
and (3) in Corollary 6.2 hold (terms of service for the quorum-based communication functionality,
Section 6.1). Therefore, the client at pi receives eventually at least a quorum of server responses
(Section 6.1). Using the same arguments as above, this proof shows that at least a quorum of
pre-write and finalize responses arrive to every non-failing client (lines 37, 38 39 and 43).
Finally, we show that the above happens within O(1) asynchronous cycles. This is because each
client operation considers a constant number of phases. Recall that each phase is associated with
a client round, which completes within O(1) asynchronous cycles (Corollary 6.2).
Definition 8.3 (Classifying local maximal tags by their phase). Let R be an Algorithm 2’s
execution, and ai,k ∈ R a step (that the server at pi ∈ P takes) in which pi executes the function
maxPhase(phs) (line 67) for the k-th time in R. We characterize maxPhaseai,k(phs)’s behavior
in R according to its argument phs (Lemma 8.4) and consider the set tags(C,D) = {t : (t, •, d) ∈
(Spj ∪ {(t0, w0,i, ‘fin’)}) ∧ d ∈ D ∧ pj ∈ C}, where D = phs and C = {pi} in the system state that
immediately precedes ai,k.
• A write maximal tag is the returned value from maxPhaseai,k(D) (lines 51 and 59), where
D = {‘pre’, ‘fin’, ‘FIN’}, i.e., the tag in the maximal tuple in tags({pi}, {‘pre’, ‘fin’, ‘FIN’}).
• A read maximal tag is the returned value from maxPhaseai,k(D \ {‘pre’}) (lines 50 and 61),
i.e., the tag in the maximal tuple in tags({pi}, {‘fin’, ‘FIN’}).
• An anchor maximal tag is the returned value from maxPhaseai,k({‘FIN’}) (line 63), i.e., the
tag in the maximal tuple in tags({pi}, {‘FIN’})).
Lemma 8.4 (Servers do not remove their maximal records). Servers (Algorithm 2) keep in
their storage the currently maximal (1.1) write, (1.2) read, and (1.3) anchor records (or any record
with a tag that is higher than the ones in these records).
Proof. Part (1.1). We show that the server (Algorithm 2) at pi does not remove from Spi
the maximal anchor record (Definition 2), i.e., the tuple with the maximal tag in tags(Spi ,D), cf.
Definition 8.3. Note that the server at pi updates and inserts records (t, •) to Spi only via the
updatePhase() function (line 69). In case that ∃(t, •) ∈ Spi , the function updatePhase() calls
the function upgradePhase() (line 71), which transfers (t, •)’s phase from ‘pre’ to ‘fin’, and ‘fin’
to ‘FIN’, but otherwise it does not change (t, •)’s phase, e.g., when p = ‘pre’. Moreover, in case
@(t, •) ∈ Spi , the server at pi merely adds (t, •) to Spi . We study each call to updatePhase() in
Algorithm 2 and show that it does not remove the currently maximal write record.
• When (t,⊥, d) : d ∈ D (lines 52 and 55) arrives to the server at pi, that server uses the
updatePhase() (lines 53 and 56) for making sure that (t, •, d) exists in Spi (line 69) in a
way that can only add a missing record (t,⊥, d) to Spi (when (t,⊥, d) /∈ Spi) or transfer the
phase of an existing record in Spi according to upgradePhase(), which does not remove the
currently maximal write record. Moreover, when (t,⊥, d) arrives either from a reader or a
writer, pi updates Spi in a manner that differ only by the response that pi sends to the client
(lines 54 and 57), i.e., irrelevant to pi’s server state after that send.
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• When gossip arrives to pi (line 58), pi calculates its new maximal write record in a way that
includes both the records in its own storage Spi and the maximal records reported recreantly
from all servers including itself (lines 59, 61 and 63). Note that pi might add a new maximal
anchor record with tag t whenever it discovers that there is a quorum of servers that have
reported about a finalized record with tag t (line 63). After calculating these new maximal
values, pi updates its storage Spi via updatePhase() (lines 60, 62 and 64), in a way that we
showed above that it does not remove the currently maximal write record.
Parts (1.2) and (1.3). The proofs here follow similar arguments to the ones of Part (1.1); it
is even simpler because phs’s values are different and thus ‘pre’ is irrelevant to Part (1.2) and only
‘FIN’ is relevant to Part (1.3).
We note that the same arguments hold also for any record that has a tag that is higher than
these maximal tags.
Lemma 8.5 (Maximal tags arrive to every server eventually). Suppose that the server at
pi ∈ P calls gossip(Tk) (Section 6.1) for an unbounded number of times in Algorithm 2’s execution,
R, such that Tk := (tk,write, tk,read, tk,anchor) is the k-th gossip that pi sends. The server at pj ∈ P
receives eventually at least one gossip (tk,write, tk,read, tk,anchor), such that each respective tag is not
less than its correspondent in (t1,write, t1,read, t1,anchor). Moreover, if R is fair, each gossip message
arrives within O(1) asynchronous cycles.
Proof. Lemma 8.4, and Claim 8.6 facilitate the proof of Claim 8.7, which implies that first part
of this lemma. Claim 8.6 considers the sequence tk,type, where p ∈ {read,write, anchor} and
Tk := (tk,write, tk,read, tk,anchor).
Claim 8.6. The sequence tk,type is non-decreasing.
Proof: The three parts of Lemma 8.4 show that the server never remove its currently maximal
write, read and anchor records. The rest of the proof is implied directly from the fact that line 67
merely calculates the currently maximal write, read and anchor records. 
Claim 8.7. The server at pj ∈ P receives at least one gossip (tk,write, tk,read, tk,anchor) eventually,
such that each respective tag is not less than its correspondent in (t1,write, t1,read, t1,anchor).
Proof: Let us consider the sequence tk,type, where type ∈ {read,write, anchor} and Tk := (tk,write,
tk,read, tk,anchor). Let ak ∈ R be a step in which pi calls gossip(Tk) for the k-th time in R. Let
adepart,k′ ∈ R be the first step that appears after ak′ : k′ ∈ {1, . . .} and before ak′+1 in R, if there is
any such step, in which pi executes the event of gossip token departure. Let aarrival,k′ ∈ R be the
first step that appears after adepart,k′ in R, if there is any such step, in which the server at pj delivers
the token that adepart,k′ transmits. By the correctness of the gossip functionality (Corollary 6.2),
step aarrival,k′ exists eventually. The proof is done, because Tk′ includes only tags, tk′ , that are no
less than their corresponding elements in T1 (Claim 8.6). 
We complete this proof by considering the case in which R is fair. Corollary 6.2, Part (3) implies
that step aarrival,k′ exists within O(1) asynchronous cycles.
Corollary 8.8 considers the calls to maxPhase(D) (lines 51, 59 and 68), to maxPhase(D \
{‘pre’}) (lines 50, 61 and 68) as well as the to maxPhase({‘FIN’}) (lines 63, and 68). The same
arguments as in the proof of Claim 8.6 imply Corollary 8.8.
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Corollary 8.8. Let phs ∈ {D,D \ {‘pre’}, {‘FIN’}} and ai,k ∈ R be a step in which the server
at pi ∈ P executes maxPhase(phs) for the k-th time in R. The sequence of maxPhaseai,k(phs)’s
returned values is non-decreasing.
8.3 Recovery After the Occurrence of Transient-Faults
The correctness of Algorithm 2 assumes that the system execution is fair. That is, every node
participates in the execution within a single asynchronous cycle. This way, the proof bounds the
number of asynchronous cycles that it takes the system to remove stale information by receiving the
largest tag values and then allowing the system to perform a valid write operation (Definition 8.11).
Definition 8.9 (Notation). Let pi be a (complete) operation in execution R. We denote by Qˆ(pi)
the quorum of servers that pi’s client receives their acknowledgments for pi’s query. Suppose that pi
is a write operation. Similarly, denote by Qpw(pi) and Qfw(pi) the quorums for pi’s pre-write, and
respectively, finalize phases. Let Tˆ (pi) be the maximum arriving tag during pi’s query (line 42).
Denote by T (pi) the tag of pi, such that when pi is a write operation, T (pi) = Tˆ (pi) + 1 is the tag in
use during pi’s pre-write (line 37) and when pi is a read operation, T (pi) = Tˆ (pi) is the maximum
arriving tag during pi’s query (line 42). Denote by cstart(R) the starting state of Algorithm 2’s
execution R. Let Tnode(R) be the set tags in the state of any node in cstart(R). Let Tcomm(R) be
the set tags in the payload of any message that is delivered during R but it is never sent during R,
because it was in transit in the communication channels in R’s starting system state, cstart(R). We
denote by T (R) = Tnode(R) ∪ Tcomm(R) the set that includes all the tags in cstart(R).
For the sake of compatibility of our proposal with the one in [12], we define the set of legal exe-
cutions (Definition 8.12) in a way that considers a recovery period from arbitrary (transient) faults
as well as the case in which the system starts from a well-initialized system state (Definition 8.10).
Definition 8.10 (A safe system start). Let csafe be a system state in which: (1) no client nor
server is executing any procedure, (2) the communication channels from the clients to the servers
(servers to clients), pingTx and every entry of pingRx (respectively, pongTx and every entry of
pongRx) include the message 〈⊥〉 (respectively, 〈⊥,⊥〉), (3) the communication channels between
any two servers, gossipTx and every entry of gossipRx include the message (t0, t0, t0), and (4) the
storage S of every server is empty. In this case, we say that csafe is one of the safe system states.
The definition of recovery Algorithm 2’s period uses the term a valid client operation (Defini-
tion 8.11).
Definition 8.11 (Valid client operations). Let pi be a complete operation in R. Suppose that
there exists a system state c ∈ R, such that c appears in R before pi’s start in cstart(pi) and pi’s tag is
greater than any tag that appears both in c and R’s starting system state, i.e., max(T (cstart(R)) ∩
T (c)) < T (pi) . In this case, we say that pi is valid.
Definition 8.12 specifies legal executions as such that follow at least one complete and valid
operation.
Definition 8.12 (Recovery periods and legal executions). Let R = RrecoveryPeriod◦RlegalExecution
be an execution of Algorithm 2 that (is legal with respect to the external building blocks in Sec-
tion 6.1 and it) has an arbitrary starting system state, cstart(R), with respect to Algorithm 2.
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Suppose that within a finite number of steps the system reaches a state cstart(picomplete&valid), such
that (1) cstart(picomplete&valid) is the starting system state of a complete and valid write opera-
tion picomplete&valid, and (2) R’s suffix, RlegalExecution, starts at cend(picomplete&valid), where atom-
icity and liveness hold with respect to any operation that is complete in suffix RlegalExecution of
R (Definition 8.1), which starts immediately after cend(picomplete&valid). In this case, we refer to
RrecoveryPeriod and RlegalExecution as R’s recovery, and respectively, legal periods. We also consider
any execution that starts from csafe (Definition 8.10) to be legal. Namely, RlegalExecution is an
asynchronous execution of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 8.12.1 shows that the system reaches a legal execution eventually. Theorems 8.15.1
and 8.22.1 show that it takes merely a single complete and valid write operation picomplete&valid
(Definition 8.12) to end the recovery period after which the system executes legally, because they
demonstrate correct shared-memory emulation. Our proof shows that fair executions guarantee
recovery. Once picomplete&valid had occurred, the correct system behavior no longer needs the above
fairness assumption. Recall that, within O(1) asynchronous cycles, Algorithm 2’s execution reaches
a suffix in which the correctness of gossip and quorum-based communication is guaranteed (Corol-
lary 6.2). Therefore, Theorem 8.12.1 considers an execution of algorithm 2 that (is legal with
respect to the external building blocks in Section 6.1), because it demonstrates that the system
reaches suffix Rno incomplete within O(1) asynchronous cycles.
Theorem 8.12.1 (Recovery after the occurrence of transient-faults). Let R be a fair exe-
cution of algorithm 2 that (is legal with respect to the external building blocks in Section 6.1 and it)
has an arbitrary starting system state, cstart(R), with respect to Algorithm 2. Within O(1) asyn-
chronous cycles, execution R = R′ ◦ Rno incomplete has a suffix Rno incomplete that does not include
incomplete operations. Moreover, within O(1) asynchronous cycles, execution Rno incomplete reaches
a suffix, RcompleteNonStable, that does not include invalid operations.
Proof. The proof is implied by Claim 8.15, which uses claims 8.13 and 8.14. Leveraging Corol-
lary 6.2, Claim 8.13 shows that Algorithm 2’s executions stop having incomplete operations.
Claim 8.13. Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 2 in which the gossip functionality behaves
correctly. Within O(1) asynchronous cycles, R includes a suffix, Rno incomplete, that does not in-
clude: (1) operations that are incomplete in R, nor (2) incomplete client requests or server replies
in R. Moreover, (3) ∃c ∈ Rno incomplete : ∀pi ∈ P : ∃t ∈ T : t′ ∈ (T (Rno incomplete)) =⇒ ∃(t, •) ∈
Spi : t ≥ t′ in c.
Proof: Part (1). Lemma 8.2 implies that all incomplete operations end within O(1) asynchronous
cycles.
Part (2). Suppose that all operations in Rno incomplete are complete, i.e., no incomplete request or
replies enter the system throughout Rno incomplete. (Due to Part (1) of this proof, we can make this
assumption without losing generality.) Lemma 8.2 implies the correct behavior of the quorum-based
communication functionality within O(1) asynchronous cycles, which implies Part (2).
For the sake of simple presentation, the rest of this proof assumes that throughout Rno incomplete,
all of client requests and server replies were indeed (Section 6.1).
Part (3). We start by showing that Tcomm(Rno incomplete) = ∅ (Definition 8.9). Parts (1) and (2)
of this proof says that Rno incomplete does not include the delivery of messages that were never sent
in R. This implies Tcomm(Rno incomplete) = ∅, because Tcomm()’s definition considers any message
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that is delivered but never sent during (due to the fact that they were in transit at the starting
system state of Rno incomplete).
Due to the above, we only show that within O(1) asynchronous cycles in Rno incomplete, the sys-
tem reaches a system state c ∈ Rno incomplete, such that ∀pi ∈ P : ∃t ∈ T : t′ ∈ (Tnode(Rno incomplete))
=⇒ ∃(t, •) ∈ Spi : t ≥ t′. Let t′ ∈ (Tnode(Rno incomplete)). Suppose that t′ appears in the client
state at node pj ∈ P. By the assumption that this theorem makes about R fairness, we know that
pj ’s client operation terminates within O(1) asynchronous cycles (Lemma 8.2). Once that happen,
the client state no longer includes any tag value (cf. part (c) of the quorum-based communication
service and Corollary 6.2). Suppose that t′ is part of the server state, i.e., ∃pj ∈ P : (t′, •) ∈ Spj .
Let us consider a choice of pj and t
′, such that t′ is maximal. By Lemma 8.5, within O(1) asyn-
chronous cycles, pi’s server receives at least one gossip that includes a tag t
′′ ≥ t′ that is not smaller
than t′. The proof is done by replacing t with t′′ in the invariant that we need to prove, i.e.,
∀pi ∈ P : ∃t′′ ∈ T : t′ ∈ (Tnode(Rno incomplete)) =⇒ ∃(t′′, •) ∈ Spi : t′′ ≥ t′. 
Claim 8.14 shows that an Rno incomplete’s operation, pi, uses a tag that is not smaller than any
(maximal) tag TmaxQuery(pi) on the servers that participate in pi’s query quorum, where tags(C,D) =
{t : (t, •, d) ∈ Spj ∧d ∈ D∧pj ∈ C} (Definition 8.3) and TmaxQuery(pi) = max tags(Qˆ(pi),D\{‘pre’})
in cstart(pi) ∈ Rno incomplete.
Claim 8.14. Let pi be an Rno incomplete’s operation. T (pi) ≥ TmaxQuery(pi) in cstart(pi) ∈ Rno incomplete.
Moreover, T (pi) > TmaxQuery(pi) when pi is a write operation.
Proof: Due to the correctness of the quorum-based communication functionality duringRno incomplete
(Claim 8.13), Corollary 8.8 as well as lines 36, 42, and 49 to 51, it holds that Tˆ (pi) is not smaller
than any write or read tag in Spj : pj ∈ Qˆ(pi) in cstart(pi). Moreover, T (pi) ≥ Tˆ (pi) (Definition 8.9)
and T (pi) > Tˆ (pi) when pi is a write operation. Thus, in cstart(pi), it holds that T (pi) is not smaller
than any tag in Spj : pj ∈ Qˆ(pi) (and it is actually greater when pi is a write operation). 
Claim 8.15 implies that any write operation piwrite in RcompleteNonStable is valid with respect to
R and by that we complete the proof.
Claim 8.15. Within O(1) asynchronous cycles, execution Rno incomplete reaches a suffix, which we
denote by RcompleteNonStable, such that for any of RcompleteNonStable’s write operations, piwrite, it
holds that T (piwrite) > max(T (Rno incomplete)) in c ∈ RcompleteNonStable.
Proof: The proof is implied by Part (3) of Claim 8.13 and Claim 8.14. 
8.4 Atomicity of Algorithm 2
We demonstrate that, after a recovery period (Definition 8.12), Algorithm 2 emulates shared atomic
read/write memory. Some elements of the following proof are similar to arguments in [12, Theorem
1]. Note that Theorem 8.15.1 considers RlegalExecution but does not require fairness. By that
it merely assumes that at least a single complete and valid write operation occurred during the
recovery period (Definition 8.12) or that the system starts in a safe state (Definition 8.10).
Theorem 8.15.1 (Atomicity). Algorithm 2 is atomic in RlegalExecution.
The ≺ order satisfies the sufficient conditions for atomicity (Corollary 8.16), which we borrow
from [12].
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Corollary 8.16 (Lemma 2 in [12]). Let Π be the set of all operations in R. Suppose that ≺ is an
irreflexive partial ordering of all the operations in Π that satisfies: (1) when pi1’s return precedes
pi2’s start in R, pi2 ≺ pi1 is false. (2) When pi1 ∈ Π is a write operation and pi2 ∈ Π is any client
operation, either pi1 ≺ pi2 or pi2 ≺ pi1 holds (but not both). (3) The value returned by each read
operation is the value written by the last preceding write operation according to ≺ (or v0, which is
the default object value in the absence of such write).
Definition 8.17. Define pi1 ≺ pi2 if (i) T (pi1) < T (pi2), or (ii) T (pi1) = T (pi2), pi1 is a write and
pi2 is a read.
We show that ≺ satisfies the conditions of Corollary 8.16. The proof of the closure property
follows similar arguments to the ones made by Cadambe et al. [12]. It shows that by the time that
operation pi ends, the tag T (pi) has finished propagating and installing the messages 〈T (pi), •, ‘fin’〉
in the storage of at least one quorum of servers (Lemma 8.18). It uses the visibility of T (pi) for
claiming that the query phase of any operation that starts after pi’s end, retrieve a tag that is at
least as large as T (pi) (Lemma 8.19). This is the basis of showing that each write operation has a
unique tag (Lemma 8.21). We complete the proof of Theorem 8.15.1 by demonstrating conditions
(1) and (2) of Corollary 8.16 (using lemmas 8.19 and 8.21) and well as condition (3) by considering
read and write operations (Algorithm 2) during RlegalExecution.
Lemma 8.18 is a variation on Lemma 3 in [12]. We use Lemma 8.4 for arguing that the servers
(Algorithm 2) store the currently maximal records (and any record with a higher tag). This
variation is needed, because Lemma 8.18 considers only operations that start after the (last) valid
and complete write operation picomplete&valid (or a system that starts in a safe system state, cf.
Definition 8.10).
Lemma 8.18 (Storing the operation records). Suppose that pi is a complete (read or write) oper-
ation in RlegalExecution. There is a quorum Qfw(pi) ∈ Q, such that all of its servers store the triple
(t, w, ‘fin’), where t = T (pi) and w ∈ W ∪ {⊥} in cend(pi) and in every system state after cend(pi).
Proof. Let Qfw(pi) the quorum that pi’s client (at node pi) receives responses from Qfw(pi)’s servers
during pi’s finalize phase (lines 38 and 43). Since pi is complete as well as the functionalities of
gossip and quorum-based communication are correct in RlegalExecution (Corollary 6.2), it is true
that the server at node pj ∈ Qfw(pi) responds to pi’s finalize message (line 55) at some step afw,j ∈
RlegalExecution. Note that: (i) pj ’s response arrives eventually to pi’s writer and that occurs before
the system reaches cend(pi), because pj ∈ Qfw(pi), as well as (ii) the servers (Algorithm 2) keep in
their storage the currently maximal (write, read, and anchor) records and any received record with
a tag that is higher than the ones in these records (Lemma 8.4).
Lemma 8.19 (Similar to Lemma 4 in [12]). Let pii : i ∈ {1, 2} be two complete operations in
R, such that each pii starts immediately after the system states c
s
i ∈ R : i ∈ {1, 2} and returns
immediately before cri ∈ R : i ∈ {1, 2}. Assume that cr1 appears before cs2 in R. (1) T (pi2) ≥ T (pi1)
and (2) when pi2 is a write operation, T (pi2) > T (pi1).
Proof. Let Tˆ (pi) be the maximum arriving tag during pi’s query (lines 36 and 42). It is suffices to
show that Tˆ (pi2) ≥ T (pi1) (Claim 8.20), because when pi2 is a read, T (pi2) = Tˆ (pi2), and when pi2 is
a write, T (pi2) > Tˆ (pi2) (see the pseudo-code of the reader and writer in Algorithm 2).
Claim 8.20. Tˆ(pi2) ≥ T(pi1).
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Proof: Let Qˆ(pii) be the set of nodes that their servers respond to pii’s query (lines 36 and 42). Note
the existence of node pj ∈ Qˆ(pi2) ∩ Qfw(pi1) (Lemma 4.1) that its server responds to pi2’s query
with (t, •, ‘qry’) (line 49) immediately after some system state cˆ2,j ∈ R, where t is the highest tag
of a finalized (or FINALIZED) record that pj stores in Spj . We argue that t ≥ T (pi1), because
(T (pi1), •, d) ∈ Spj : d ∈ D \ {‘pre’} in cˆ2,j and t is Spj ’s highest finalized tag in cˆ2,j . In detail, we
argue the following.
1. The fact that pj ∈ Qfw(pi1) implies (T (pi1), •, d) ∈ Spj : d ∈ D \ {‘pre’} as long as cˆ2,j appears
after cend(pi1) in R (Lemma 8.18). Moreover, cˆ2,j indeed appears after cend(pi1) in R, since c
r
1
appears before cs2 in R (by this lemma assumption) and c
s
2 cannot appear after cˆ2,j (by the
fact that cˆ2,j appears immediately before the response to a query that is sent immediately
after cs2).
2. The fact that pj ∈ Qˆ(pi2) implies that pj responds to pi2’s query (by Qˆ(pi2)’s definition),
3. The server at pj replies with (t, •, ‘qry’) to pi2’s query, such that (t, •, d) ∈ Spj : d ∈ D\{‘pre’},
where t is Spj ’s highest finalized (or FINALIZED) tag (line 49) in cˆ2,j .
Since t ≥ T (pi1), it holds that pi2’s query phase includes the reception of a response with a tag
that is no smaller than T (pi1). Thus, Tˆ (pi2) ≥ T (pi1). 
Lemma 8.21 (cf. Lemma 5 in [12]). Let pi1 and pi2 be two write operations in R. T (pi1) 6= T (pi2).
Proof. Denote by idi :∈ {1, 2} the identifier of the node that invokes operation pii. Note that
id1 6= id2 implies T (pi1) 6= T (pi2), because T (pii) = (zi, idi) (lines 37, 38 and 39, Algorithm 2).
Thus, until the end of this proof, we focus on the case in which id1 = id2. The client (at node pi)
performs sequentially the operations pi1 and pi2 (Section 5), i.e., one of them ends before the other
starts. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that pi1 ends before pi2 starts. T (pi2) > T (pi1)
(Lemma 8.19) implies that T (pi2) 6= T (pi1).
Proof of Theorem 8.15.1. For any two operations pi1, pi2, the definition of ≺ (Corollary 8.16)
says pi1 ≺ pi2 when: (i) T (pi1) < T (pi2), or (ii) T (pi1) = T (pi2) as long as pi1 is a write and pi2 is
a read. Suppose that operations pi1 and pi2 occur in Algorithm 2’s legal execution RlegalExecution.
After verifying that ≺ is indeed a partial order, we show the three properties of Corollary 8.16.
The relation ≺ is a partial order. We demonstrate that pi1 ≺ pi2 =⇒ pi2 ⊀ pi1 by assuming
that this statement is false, i.e., pi1 ≺ pi2 ∧ pi2 ≺ pi1, and then show a contradiction. Note that
(T (pi1) ≤ T (pi2)) ∧ (T (pi2) ≤ T (pi1)) =⇒ T (pi1) = T (pi2) (≤’s definition). Therefore, pi1 is a write
and pi2 is a read (Part (ii), Definition 8.17). Using symmetrical arguments, pi2 is a write and pi1 is
a read. A contradiction.
Property (1) of Corollary 8.16. Assume that pi1 returns before pi2 starts in R. We show that
whether pi2 is a read or a write, it holds that pi2 ≺ pi1 is false.
• When pi2 is a read, T (pi2) ≥ T (pi1) (Lemma 8.19 as well as the assumption that pi1 returns
before pi2 starts). Thus, pi2 ≺ pi1 is false, because otherwise, by Definition 8.17 of the order
≺, it holds that: (i) T (pi1) > T (pi2), which contradicts the above, or (ii) pi2 is a write (Defini-
tion 8.17 of the order ≺). Moreover, with respect to case (ii), if pi2 is a write, T (pi2) > T (pi1)
(Lemma 8.19 as well as the assumption that pi1 returns before pi2 starts). Thus, pi1 ≺ pi2
is true (case (i), Definition 8.17 of the order ≺). Moreover, pi2 ≺ pi1 is false (≺ is a partial
order).
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• When pi2 is a write T (pi2) > T (pi1) (Lemma 8.19 as well as the assumption that pi1 returns
before pi2 starts). Thus, pi1 ≺ pi2 is true (case (i), Definition 8.17 of the order ≺). Moreover,
pi2 ≺ pi1 is false (≺ is a partial order)
Property (2) of Corollary 8.16. Lemma 8.21 implies that only case (i) of Definition 8.17
holds. This implies Property (2), i.e., either pi1 ≺ pi2 or pi2 ≺ pi1 (but not both) hold.
Property (3) of Corollary 8.16. We show that every read operation pi in a legal execution
RlegalExecution returns a value that a preceding, according to ≺, write operation writes. (In the
absence of such write operations, the read operation pi returns v0, which is the default object value,
line 47).) To that end, we argue that: (i) there is a unique coupling between object version values
and tag values and (ii) the read operation pi returns the value associated with T (pi).
(i) Unique coupling between object version values and tag values. Recall that the
system reaches RlegalExecution after the system has performed at least one complete and valid write
operation pigreatFIN ∈ RcompleteNonStable (Definition 8.12 and Theorem 8.12.1). After pigreatFIN ,
any succeeding write operation pifurtherWrite in RlegalExecution couples uniquely between versions
of the data object and write operations in R (Section 5). We know that all written versions are
uniquely associated with tag values (Lemma 8.21). We note that even when starting the system
in a state that includes no written object values, the servers reply with (t0, w0,i, ‘fin’) (line 47) and
the reader returns the decoding of that value (line 45).
(ii) The read operation pi returns the value associated with T (pi). The complete read
operation pilegitimateRead ∈ RlegalExecution returns a value that is the result of retrieving and inverting
the MDS code Φ using k coded elements (line 45 and Definition 8.3). These k coded elements
were obtained at some previous point by applying Φ to the value associated with T (pi), where
pi ∈ {pigreatFIN , pifurtherWrite} (line 37). Therefore, the read operation pi returns the value associated
with T (pi) due to the correctness of Φ (Section 5).
8.5 Liveness of Algorithm 2
Definition 8.22 (Liveness criteria). Suppose that there are no more than f server failures and
that 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 2f . In any fair and legal execution of Algorithm 2, it holds that: (1) every
operation terminates, and (2) the server replies to a reader’s finalize phase includes at least k
(different) coded elements (and thus read operations can decode the retrieved values).
Theorem 8.22.1 (Liveness). The liveness criteria (Definition 8.22) hold in Algorithm 2’s fair
and legal executions.
Proof. Note that Lemma 8.2 implies Part (1) of the liveness criteria (Definition 8.22). Therefore, we
focus on proving that read operations can decode the retrieved values (Part (2) of Definition 8.22).
I.e., at least k servers include coded elements in their replies to a reader’s finalize phase. The proof
is implied from claims 8.23 and 8.24 and the fact that Algorithm 2’s servers do not remove records
from their storage.
Claim 8.23. The query of a read operation pir in RlegalExecution always returns a tag t that is either
t0 or refers to the tag of a write operation piw that had a complete pre-write phase in R.
Proof: Definition 8.12 implies that piw always occurred before the legal execution (or the servers
only consider the default tuple with the tag t0). Lemma 8.4 says that the servers do not remove
their maximal records. Upon the arrival of pir’s query message, the server reply with piw’s tag
(line 50), which is t. 
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Claim 8.24. As long the no server removes the record (t, •) from its storage, if it had any such
record in cstart(pir), at least k servers include coded elements in their replies to pir’s finalize phase.
Proof: Let Qpw(t) denote the set of nodes that their servers acknowledge the pre-write phase of
the write operation piw for which t = T (piw). Let ci be the system state that occurs immediately
before the server at pi acknowledges pir’s finalize message (line 57). We show that the storage Spi
of every node pi ∈ Qpw(t) ∩ Qfw(t) includes a coded element in ci. Since pi ∈ Qpw(t), it holds
that (t, wt,i, •) ∈ Spi in any system state that follows the step in which pi received piw’s pre-write
message (line 52 and by the assumption of this claim that no server removes the record (t, •) from
its storage). Note that pi ∈ Qfw(t) indeed acknowledges the reader’s finalize message, because
of Claim 8.23 and the fact that ci appears in R after pi acknowledges that pre-write message.
Therefore, pi includes in its reply the coded element wt,i. By the correctness of the quorum-based
communication during legal executions (Theorem 8.12.1, Claim 8.13), pir receives at least k coded
elements in its finalize phase, because |Qpw(t) ∩Qfw(t)| ≥ k (Part(1) of Lemma 4.1). 
9 A Bounded Set of Relevant Server Records
Algorithm 2’s servers store the entire set of records that have arrived from the clients and the gossip
service. This is in addition to the records that originated from the system starting state. To the
end of bounding the number records that each server needs to store, we consider the relevance of
a record with respect to the way that the servers use it after any point of time, i.e., a record is
irrelevant in system state c ∈ RlegalExecution if the server at pi ∈ P never use it after c for responding
to a client request. Theorem 9.17.1 and Corollary 9.18 point out a set that includes all relevant
records and bound it by N + δ + 3 during executions RlegalExecution in which there are no more
than δ write operations that occur concurrently with any read operation.
Definition 9.1 (Tag visibility). Let R be an execution of Algorithm 2, pir be a read operation
and piw be a write operation in R. Denote by cvisibility(pir) = cend(pir), which refers to pir’s ending
system state. We say that pir has visibility in R starting from cvisibility(pir). Moreover, denote
by cvisibility(piw) ∈ R either: (i) the first system state, if such a state exists, for which a quorum
Q ∈ Q of non-failing nodes that their servers store the finalized record (T (piw), •, d) ∈ Spj∈Q : d ∈
D\{‘pre’}, or (ii) when case (i) does not hold in R (because operation piw fails in R), cvisibility(piw) =
cend(piw), which refers to piw’s ending system state. When case (i) holds for piw, we say that piw has
visibility in R starting from cvisibility(piw). Otherwise, piw’s visibility is not guaranteed in R.
Definition 9.2 (Explicit and implicit FINALIZED tags and records). Suppose that the server at
node pi stores a finalized (or FINALIZED) record r = (t, •, d) ∈ Spi : t ∈ T ∧ d ∈ D \ {‘pre’} in
system state c ∈ R. In this case, we say that tag t and record r are explicitly finalized (with respect
to the server) at pi. Moreover, we say that tag t and record r are explicitly FINALIZED at pi when
(t, •, ‘FIN’) ∈ Spi : t ∈ T in system state c ∈ R.
Suppose that the server at node pi stores two records r1, r2 ∈ Spi : ∃pj∈P∀x∈{1,2}tx = (zx, j) ∧
rx = (tx, •) in system state c ∈ R that their tags, tx = (z1, j), and respectively, tx = (z2, j), are
associated with the client at pj. Moreover, suppose that t1 < t2. In this case, we say that tag t1 and
record r1 are implicitly FINALIZED (in with respect to the server) at pi. We denote Spi’s explicit
FINALIZED records in c by Si,expFIN := {(t, •, ‘FIN’) ∈ Spi} and Spi’s implicitly FINALIZED
records in c by Si,impFIN := {((z1, j), •) ∈ Spi : ∃((z2, j), •) ∈ Spi ∧ z1 < z2}.
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Claim 9.3 shows that an implicitly FINALIZED record at a server implies explicitly FINALIZED
records at a server quorum.
Claim 9.3. Suppose that RlegalExecution includes a write operation pi, such that in system state c ∈
RlegalExecution it holds that T (pi) is implicitly FINALIZED at pi. (1) pi is visible in c. (2) There is
a quorum Q ∈ Q of nodes that their servers store the FINALIZED record (T (pi), •, ‘FIN’) ∈ Spj∈Q.
Suppose that in c it holds that T (pi) is explicitly FINALIZED at pi, i.e., (T (pi), •, ‘FIN’) ∈ Spi. (3)
pi is visible in c.
Proof: We start the proof by showing that pi includes the entire execution of the FINALIZED phase
before RlegalExecution reaches the system state c. We do that by demonstrating that pi is not an
incomplete operation nor a failed one. Recall that Claim 8.13 implies that RlegalExecution does not
include (write) operations that are incomplete and thus pi is not an incomplete operation. This claim
assumes that in system state c, it holds that T (pi) is implicitly FINALIZED at pi. This means that,
in c, the server at node pi stores two records r1, r2 ∈ Spi : rx = (tx, •), tx ∈ T ∧ tx = (zx, j)∧pj ∈ P,
such that T (pi) = t1 < t2 (Definition 9.2). By the assumption that each node pj ∈ P lets its client to
run just one procedure at a time, by the assumption that failing clients do not resume (Section 5.3.1),
and by the writer code (lines 36 and 40), we have that pi is not a failed operation. Therefore, pi is
a complete write operation that ends before c. In particular, pi’s finalized and FINALIZED phases
are done before R reaches c and thus parts (1) and (2) are correct (by Definition 9.1 and the correct
operation of the quorum-based communications Corollary 6.2). To show that part (3) also holds,
we note that during RlegalExecution, any write operation pi, which is after picomplete&valid, updates
to the record (T (pi), •, ‘FIN’) ∈ Spi occurs only after the completion of the finalized phase (line 38
and 39). Thus, visibility is implied (Definition 9.1). 
Definition 9.4 (The done system state cdone(pi)). Let R be an execution of Algorithm 2 and pi
be a client (read or write) operation in R. Let ak(pi) ∈ R be the step in which a server (at node
pi ∈ P) adds or updates the record (T (pi), •) to its server storage, Spi for the k-th time. This update
could be due to the pi operation itself, another read operation pir 6= pi for which T (pir) = T (pi), or
the arrival of a gossip message (•, T (pi), •). Denote c0(pi) := cstart(pi), ck(pi) is the system state
that immediately follows ai,k(pi) and clast(pi) = c`(pi), where ` is the maximum value of ` for which
∃c`(pi) ∈ R. We denote by cdone(pi) ∈ {clast(pi), cend(pi)} the system state that appears latest in R
between clast(pi) and cend(pi).
Definition 9.5 (Concurrent operations). Let pi1 and pi2 be two operations in R. Suppose that
@x, y ∈ {1, 2} : x 6= y, such that cdone(pix) appears before cstart(piy) in R. In this case, we say that
pi1 and pi2 appear to be concurrent in R.
We note that one way to explain Definition 9.5, is to say the following. When cdone(pix) appears
before cstart(piy) in R, we can say that R orders pix before piy sequentially. Moreover, pi1 and pi2
appears to be concurrent in R if, and only if, R neither orders pix before piy nor piy before pix.
Definition 9.6 (δ-bounded concurrent write operations during any read in R). Suppose that for
every read operation pir in R, it holds that there are at most δ write operations in R that are
concurrent with pir. In this case, we say that the number of concurrent write operations that occur
in R during any read operation is bounded by δ in R.
Definition 9.7 (Record relevance). Let r = (t, •) ∈ Spi : t ∈ T be a record that the server at node
pi ∈ P stores in system state c ∈ R. Suppose that there is a step ai that appears in R after c and
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in which the server at node pi responses to a (1) writer query request (line 51), (2) reader query
request (line 50) or (3) reader finalized request (lines 55) with a message that includes tag t′ ≤ t.
In this case, we say that tag t and record r are of relevance to c with respect to a (1) writer query
request, (2) reader query request, and respectively, (3) reader finalized request.
Definition 9.8 (The Ti,writeQuery, Ti,readQuery and Ti,readF inalized sets). Let pi ∈ P be a node with
a server. Let ti,F INALIZED = ti,1, ti,2, . . . : (ti,k, •) ∈ (Si,expFIN ∪ Si,impFIN) (Definition 9.7) be a
(possibly empty) sequence tags in a descending order that are explicitly or implicitly FINALIZED
at pi in system state c. Let maxTi,F INALIZED = max{ti,x ∈ ti,F INALIZED} and Ti,F INALIZED =
{ti,x ∈ ti,F INALIZED : x ≤ δ + 1}. Let Ti,notY etFIN = {t : (t, •) ∈ Spi \ (Si,expFIN ∪ Si,impFIN)} be a
(possibly empty) set of tags that are at pi’s record storage and are not in Ti,F INALIZED in system
state c. Let Ti,writeQuery = {max{t : (t, •) ∈ Spi}}, Ti,readQuery = {max{t : (t, •, d) ∈ Spi : d ∈
(D \ {‘pre’})}} and Ti,readF inalized = Ti,notY etFIN ∪ Ti,F INALIZED in system state c.
Lemma 9.9. Suppose that during any read operation in RlegalExecution there are at most δ con-
current write operations. Suppose that RlegalExecution includes a read operation pir and a step
ai ∈ RlegalExecution in which the server at pi responds with (T (pir), •) to pir’s finalize request (line 55),
such that RlegalExecution includes a write operation piw for which T (piw) = T (pir). (If there is more
than just one such operation, we select the latest one that appears before pir and note that by The-
orem 8.15.1 these operations cannot be concurrent.) It holds that T (pir) ∈ Ti,readF inalized in any
system state c ∈ RlegalExecution that is between ci,in ∈ RlegalExecution and ci,out ∈ RlegalExecution,
where ci,in is RlegalExecution’s first system state for which (T (pir), •) ∈ Spi holds and ci,out is the
system state that immediately precedes ai.
Proof.
Claim 9.10. Let c ∈ RlegalExecution be a system state. |Si,notY etFIN | ≤ N holds in c (Defini-
tion 9.8).
Proof: By the definition of Si,impFIN := {((z1, j), •) ∈ Spi : ∃((z2, j), •) ∈ Spi ∧ z1 < z2} (Def-
inition 9.2), it holds that Si,notY etFIN := S \ (Si,expFIN ∪ Si,impFIN) does not include any record
((z1, j), •) for which ((z2, j), •) ∈ Si,notY etFIN and z1 < z2. Therefore, every client can have at
most one tag that appear in a record that belongs to Si,notY etFIN . The proof of this claim is
implied by the upper bound on the number of clients, which is N (Section 2.1). 
Claim 9.11. Let tstart be the maximum visible tag in cstart(pir) ∈ R. It holds that tstart ≤ T (pir).
Proof: By the assumption that tstart is the maximum visible tag in cstart(pir), it holds that there
is a quorum Q ∈ Q of nodes that their servers store the finalized record (T (pi), •, d) ∈ Spj∈Q : d ∈
D \ {‘pre’} (Definition 9.1), such that pi is a write operation in R and T (pi) = tstart. Let Qˆ(pir) be
the set of nodes that pir’s client receives their query responses (Definition 8.9). Note the existence
of node pj ∈ Qˆ(pi) ∩ Q (Lemma 4.1) that its server responds to pir’s query with a tag that is at
least tstart (line 57). The rest of the proof is implied by line 42 and Part (2) of Corollary 6.2. 
Claim 9.12. Let ti,start := maxTi,F INALIZED be Ti,F INALIZED’s the maximum tag in cstart(pir) ∈
R. It holds that ti,start ≤ T (pir).
Proof: Part (1) of Claim 9.3 implies that tag ti,start is visible in cstart(pir). Let tstart be the maximal
tag that has visibility in cstart(pir) ∈ R, i.e., ti,start ≤ tstart. By Claim 9.11, we have that ti,start ≤
tstart ≤ T (pir), which implies this claim. 
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Claim 9.13. Let tvisibility(c) ∈ T be the maximum explicitly visible tag in system state c ∈
RlegalExecution. Suppose that T (pir) ≥ tvisibility(c) in system state c ∈ RlegalExecution that is be-
tween cj,in ∈ RlegalExecution and cj,out ∈ RlegalExecution, where pj ∈ P. In c, it holds that: (1)
T (pir) ≥ maxTi,F INALIZED, and (2) (T (pir), •) ∈ Spj implies T (pir) ∈ {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥
maxTj,F INALIZED} ∪ {maxTj,F INALIZED}.
Proof: Part (1). Recall that maxTj,F INALIZED = max{tj,x ∈ tj,F INALIZED} (Definition 9.8),
where tj,F INALIZED = tj,1, tj,2, . . . : (tj,k, •) ∈ (Sj,impFIN ∪ Sj,expFIN) (Definition 9.7). Let us
consider any tag that is either in Sj,impFIN or Sj,expFIN, i.e., any tag that is FINALIZED either
(i) implicitly or (ii) explicitly. That is, we look at the cases in which (i) (T (pir), •) ∈ Spj : pk ∈
P ∧ T (pir) = (z1, k) ∧ ∃((z2, k), •) ∈ Spj : z1 < z2 in c, or (ii) (T (pir), •, ‘FIN’) ∈ Spj in c. Parts (1),
and respectively, (3) of Claim 9.3 imply that T (pir) has visibility in c. This claim assumption says
that T (pir) ≥ tvisibility(c). Therefore, T (pir) ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED (Claim 9.12).
Part (2). By definitions 9.2 and 9.8, (T (pir), •) ∈ Spj implies that either (T (pir), •) ∈ (Sj,impFIN∪
Sj,expFIN) or (T (pir), •) ∈ Tj,notY etFIN . Part (1) of this proof consider the former case and implies
that T (pir) ∈ {maxTj,F INALIZED} in c. The latter refers to the cases that Part (1) of this proof do
not consider. That is, (T (pir), •, d) ∈ Spj : d ∈ D\{‘FIN’}∧pk ∈ P∧T (pir) = (z1, k)∧@((z2, k), •) ∈
Spj : z1 < z2, which implies (T (pir), •, d) ∈ Tj,notY etFIN . 
Claim 9.14. Let tvisibility(c) ∈ T be the maximum explicitly visible tag in system state c ∈
RlegalExecution and c1, c2, . . . be a sequence of all system states in RlegalExecution (in the order that
they appear in RlegalExecution). (1) (tvisibility(c), •) ∈ Spj implies tvisibility(c) ∈ {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN :
t ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED}∪{maxTj,F INALIZED} in c. (2) The sequence tvisibility(c1), tvisibility(c2), . . .
is monotonically increasing, i.e., tvisibility(ck) ≤ tvisibility(ck+1).
Proof: Part (1). This is implied by Part (1) of Claim 9.13 and the definition of Tj,notY etFIN .
Part (2). According to Algorithm 2, the server at pj ∈ P does not remove the records in
{t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED} ∪ {maxTj,F INALIZED}. The max function properties
imply this part. 
Claim 9.15. Let c1, c2 ∈ RlegalExecution be two system states that appear between cj,in ∈ RlegalExecution
and cj,out ∈ RlegalExecution, where pj ∈ P. It holds that |(S1 ∪ S2) \ (S1 ∩ S2)| ≤ δ, where
Sx ∈ {1, 2} = Spi in cx.
Proof: By this lemma assumption, any read operation pi in RlegalExecution has at most δ concurrent
write operations (Definition 9.6). Recall that RlegalExecution does not include incomplete operations
(Claim 8.13). Therefore, an update or an addition of the record (t, •) to Spi (between ci,in and
ci,out) implies that there is write operation piw′ that is concurrent (Definition 9.5) with the read
operation pi. Thus, this claim. (Note that the same holds for this lemma’s read operation, pir.) 
Claim 9.16. Let ti,F INALIZED,c′ = ti,F INALIZED denote the value of the sequence ti,F INALIZED
in c′ ∈ R. Let c ∈ RlegalExecution be a system state that is between ci,in and ci,out. The se-
quence ti,F INALIZED,c includes at most δ tags that are greater than T (pir), which are not in
ti,F INALIZED,cstart(pir).
Proof: Claim 9.12 implies that T (pir) is greater than any element in ti,F INALIZED,cstart(pir). From
Claim 9.15, we get that, between cstart(pir) and ci,out, Algorithm 2 may add to the sequence
ti,F INALIZED at most δ records. Hence, the claim. 
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Claim 9.17. Let c ∈ RlegalExecution be a system state that is between ci,in and ci,out. It holds that
T (pir) ∈ Ti,readF inalized (Definition 9.8) in c.
Proof:
Suppose that ci,in appears before cstart(pir) in RlegalExecution. We show that the conditions
of Claim 9.13 hold in c and thus T (pir) ∈ Ti,readF inalized. Specifically, we show that T (pir) ≥
tvisibility(c) in c and that (T (pir), •) ∈ Spi in c, because then we can complete the proof by using
Ti,readF inalized = Ti,notY etFIN ∪ Ti,F INALIZED (Definition 9.8).
Let us look at the case in which c appears between ci ,in and cstart(pir) in RlegalExecution
(including both system states ci,in and cstart(pir) as possible values of c). Recall that
T (pir) ≥ tvisibility(cstart(pir)) (Claim 9.11) and that tvisibility(cstart(pir)) ≥ tvisibility(c) (Part (2)
of Claim 9.14 and this case assumption that c appears no later than cstart(pir) in R). Thus,
T (pir) ≥ tvisibility(c).
To the end of showing that (T (pir), •) ∈ Spi in c, we start by assuming that c = ci,in and
then consider every system state c that appears between ci,in and cstart(pir) (including the latter
state). Recall that ci,in is RlegalExecution’s first system state for which (T (pir), •) ∈ Spi holds (cf.
this lemma’s statement). Therefore, (T (pir), •) ∈ Spj implies T (pir) ∈ {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥
maxTj,F INALIZED} ∪ {maxTj,F INALIZED} ⊆ Ti,readF inalized in c = ci,in (Part (2) of Claim 9.13).
Now, let us continue by assuming that c is the state in RlegalExecution that immediately follows
ci,in (and yet c does not appear in RlegalExecution after cstart(pir)). By the same arguments as
above, it holds that T (pir) ≥ tvisibility(c). Algorithm 2 does not include a line in which a server
removes a record from its storage. Thus, we only need to show that T (pir) does not leave the set
Ti,readF inalized in the transition from ci,in to c. We show more than that, i.e., T (pir) does not leave
the set {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED} ∪ {maxTj,F INALIZED} ⊆ Ti,readF inalized in the
transition from ci,in to c.
We note that it cannot be the case that in ci,in we have T (pir) ∈ {maxTj,F INALIZED} and
T (pir) /∈ {maxTj,F INALIZED} in c. The reason is that T (pir) ∈ {maxTj,F INALIZED} in ci,in says
that T (pir) is (either explicitly or implicitly) FINALIZED in ci,in and that status filed in the record
cannot change to a status that is not (either explicitly or implicitly) FINALIZED (Algorithm 2
and the way that Definition 9.8 constructs ti,F INALIZED).
Suppose that in ci,in it holds that T (pir) ∈ {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED} and in
c it holds that T (pir) /∈ {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED}. This implies that tag T (pir)
becomes (either explicitly or implicitly) FINALIZED during that transition (Definition 9.8), That
is, T (pir) ∈ {maxTj,F INALIZED} in c and the proof is done.
The rest of the proof of this part is followed by repeating the same arguments for every two
consecrative system states c′ and c′′ that are between ci,in and cstart(pir).
Let us look at the case in which c appears between cstart(pir) and ci,out in RlegalExecution
(including both system states cstart(pir) and ci,out as possible values of c). From the
proof of the previous case, when c = cstart(pir), it holds that T (pir) ∈ {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥
maxTj,F INALIZED} ∪ {maxTj,F INALIZED} ⊆ Ti,readF inalized. Recall also from the previous case
that if Algorithm 2 causes T (pir) to leave the set {t ∈ Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED}, then
T (pir) becomes a member of the sequence ti,F INALIZED (Algorithm 2 and the way that Defini-
tion 9.8 constructs ti,F INALIZED). From Claim 9.16, we get that Algorithm 2 may move T (pir)
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down the sequence ti,F INALIZED, by including other (either explicitly or implicitly) FINALIZED
records with higher tags, at most δ times between cstart(pir) and ci,out but still include T (pir) in
Ti,F INALIZED. This implies T (pir) ∈ Ti,readF inalized (Definition 9.8) for the case in which c ap-
pears between cstart(pir ) and ci ,out in RlegalExecution as well as the case in which ci,in appears before
cstart(pir) in RlegalExecution.
Suppose that ci,in appears after cstart(pir) in RlegalExecution. By this case assumption, it
holds that the tag T (pir) does not appear in the sequence ti,F INALIZED in cstart(pir). From
Claim 9.16, we get that Algorithm 2 may include in the sequence ti,F INALIZED at most δ (ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly) FINALIZED records with higher tags than T (pir) during the pe-
riod that is between cstart(pir) and ci,out. During this period, the record (T (pir), •) ∈ Spi does
appear in the storage of the server at pi. By the arguments above, it appears either in {t ∈
Tj,notY etFIN : t ≥ maxTj,F INALIZED} or in the top δ + 1 tags of ti,F INALIZED. Therefore,
T (pir) ∈ Ti,F INALIZED (Definition 9.8) and we can complete the proof by using Ti,readF inalized =
Ti,notY etFIN ∪ Ti,F INALIZED (Definition 9.8). 
Theorem 9.17.1 (Only Ti,writeQuery, Ti,readQuery and Ti,readF inalized are relevant and they are
bounded). Let r = (t, •) ∈ Spi : t ∈ T be a record that the server at node pi ∈ P stores in
system state c ∈ RlegalExecution. Suppose that tag t is of relevance to c with respect to a (1)
writer query request, (2) reader query request or (3) reader finalized request. The server at pi
stores the record r = (t, wj , •) ∈ Spj∈Q and r ∈ relevant(Si), such that (1) r ∈ Ti,writeQuery, (2)
r ∈ Ti,readQuery, and respectively, (3) r ∈ Ti,readF inalized in c. Moreover, |relevant(Si)| ≤ N+δ+3,
where relevant(Si) := Ti,writeQuery ∪ Ti,readQuery ∪ Ti,readF inalized.
Proof.
Showing that r ∈ Ti,writeQuery. By this lemma assumption and Definition 9.7 it implies
that Ti,writeQuery = {max{t : (t, •) ∈ Spi}} in c (Definition 9.8). The server at node pi replies to a
reader by returning the maximal tag t in any record stored in Spi (line 50). Therefore, the server
at pi and Ti,writeQuery store in system state c any record (t
′, •) that is relevant with respect to a
writer query request.
Showing that r ∈ Ti,readQuery. By this lemma assumption and Definition 9.7 it implies
that Ti,readQuery = {max{t : (t, •, d) ∈ Spi : d ∈ (D \ {‘pre’})}} in c (Definition 9.8). The server at
node pi replies to a reader by returning the tag t in any finalized or FINALIZED record stored in
Spi (line 50). Therefore, the server at pi and Ti,readQuery store in system state c any record (t
′, •)
that is relevant with respect to a reader query request.
Showing that r ∈ Ti,readFinalized. The proof of this case is implied by Lemma 9.9.
The bound |relevant(Si)| ≤ N + δ + 3. This bound comes from the Definition 9.8, which
implies |Ti,writeQuery| ≤ 1 and |Ti,readQuery| ≤ 1 as well as the definition of Ti,readF inalized and
Claim 9.15, which implies that during executions that have at most δ concurrent write operations,
it holds that |Ti,readF inalized| ≤ N + δ + 1.
Corollary 9.18 is implied directly from the definition of the set relevant(Si) (Theorem 9.17.1),
Theorem 9.17.1 and line 58 to 65 of Algorithm 2.
Corollary 9.18. Let pi ∈ P be a node that hosts a server. The set relevant(Si) (Theorem 9.17.1)
always includes the records (twrite, •), (tread, •) and (tanchor, •), which pi gossips their tags in the
triple (twrite, tread, tanchor) (line 65).
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1. Once the server at pi ∈ P stores in Spi a record with a tag that is at least ttop =
(MAXINT,minID), where minID := max{k : pk ∈ P}, the server at pi suspends all
responses to new write operations (at their query phase) while allowing the completion of
the existing ones (until all servers agree on the highest finalized tag, cf. item 2), where
MAXINT ∈ Z+, say, MAXINT = 264−1. To that end, the server program tests whether
(maxPhase(D) ≤ ttop) and respond to the writer only when the tests passes. That is, we
modify line 51 to “else if (maxPhase(D) ≤ ttop) then reply(j, (maxPhase(D),⊥, ‘qry’)).”
2. While the invocation of new write operations is suspended by the modified line 51 (item 1),
the gossip procedure keeps on propagating the maximal tags, which is tagTuple()’s returned
value in lines 58 and 65 (as we show in Claim 10.3). Eventually, the servers at all nodes
share the same triple of maximal tags. At that point in time, this Algorithm 2’s variation
uses the global reset procedure globalReset(t) (Section 6.2) that (i) removes any record
for all the server storages other than the ones with the tag t = maxPhase(D \ {‘pre’}),
(ii) replaces the tag t = (z, k) in that record with the tag (1, k) and (iii) stops forever all
on-going client operations. To that end, between lines 64 and 65, the server program also
includes the following if-statement: “if (maxPhase(D) ≥ ttop) ∧ (∀pk ∈ P : gossip[k] =
tagTuple()) ∧ (tagTuple() = (t, t′, t′) ∧ t ≥ t′) then globalReset(maxPhase(D \ {‘pre’}))
else S ← relevant(S),” where relevant(S) is taken from Theorem 9.17.1.
Figure 3: A bounded extension of Algorithm 2.
10 A Bounded Variation on Algorithm 2
We present a variation of Algorithm 2 that has bounded message and state size. Figure 3 adds
a couple of lines to the code of Algorithm 2 and uses the external building block globalReset()
(Section 6.2). Theorem 10.4 demonstrates the correctness of the proposed variation. Note that the
proof assumes the execution to be fair eventually in the manner of self-stabilizing systems in the
presence of seldom fairness (Section 5). Namely, once the storage of at least one server includes
at least one record with a tag t that is at least ttop (Figure 3), we require the system execution to
eventually be fair until all nodes return from the call to globalReset(). This requirement is indeed
seldom, because such fair executions are needed only once in every O(zmax) write operations and
during the recovery from rare transient faults (Theorem 8.15.1). After the recovery period and
during the periods in which no server stores tag t ≥ ttop, the execution is not required to be fair.
Definition 10.1 (Legitimate overflows). We say that system state c is overflow-free when every tag
t < ttop in c is smaller than the one that would trigger an overflow event. We say that execution R
has a legitimate overflow event if R’s starting system state c is (i) both overflow-free and reset-free
(Section 6.2.2) as well as (ii) the first step that immediately follows c includes the start (the first
sent request to the server) of a pre-write phase that has the tag t ≥ ttop. Let R′′ be a suffix of
R = R′ ◦ R′′ that (a) includes a starting system state in which any pi ∈ P (that hosts a server)
stores a record (t, •) ∈ Spi with tag t ≥ ttop and (b) R′ is the shortest matching prefix of R′′ in R.
In this case, we say that R′′ is an execution with a legitimate overflow record. (Note that R′′ may
have system states, including the starting one, with tags t′ ≥ ttop, such that t 6= t′.)
Lemma 10.2 (Eventual recovery of Algorithm 2’s variation in Figure 3). Let R be a fair execution
of the bounded variation of Algorithm 2 (Figure 3). Suppose that in R’s starting system state,
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c, it holds that there is a node pi ∈ P (that hosts a server) stores a record (t, •) ∈ Spi with tag
t ≥ ttop (but R is not necessarily an execution with a legitimate overflow record). Within O(Ψ)
asynchronous cycles, R reaches a system state that is reset- and overflow-free.
Proof. Recall that the reset procedure has a termination period within Ψ asynchronous cycles
(Section 6.2.2). Thus, within Ψ asynchronous cycles, the system reaches a state c′ ∈ R that is
reset-free. Note that if c′ is also overflow-free, the proof is done. Therefore, we consider the
complementary case and assume that c is reset-free but not necessarily overflow-free, i.e., (t, •) ∈ Spi
with tag t ≥ ttop. Claim 10.3 shows that within O(1) asynchronous cycles, the overflow handling
proceeds to the invocation of the reset procedure (item 2 of Figure 3), which in turn brings the
system to a reset- and overflow-free state within Ψ asynchronous cycles. Therefore, the proof is
done, because we showed that within O(Ψ) asynchronous cycles, the system reaches a state in R
that is both reset- and overflow-free.
Claim 10.3. Within O(1) asynchronous cycles, the system reaches a state, c′, in which Condi-
tion (1) holds, where t, t′, t′′ ∈ T : t ≤ t′ ∧ t′ ≥ t′′.
∃pi ∈ P : (maxPhasei(D) = t′ ≥ ttop) ∧
(∀pk ∈ P : gossipi[k] = tagTuplei()) ∧
(tagTuplei() = (t
′, t′′, t′′))
(1)
Proof: Suppose that this claim is false and R includes a prefix R′ with more than O(1) asynchronous
cycles in which Condition (1) does not hold in every c′′ ∈ R′.
We show that ∃cstop ∈ R′ : ∀pj ∈ P : (t, •) ∈ Spj : t ≥ ttop. Note that, within O(1) asyn-
chronous cycles, the gossip protocol works correctly (Part (3) of Corollary 6.2). Moreover, the
function tagTuple() returns (maxPhase(D), maxPhase(D\{‘pre’}),maxPhase({‘FIN’})) (line 68)
and this triple is sent by the gossip service. This claim assumes that (t, •) ∈ Spi , which implies
that within O(1) asynchronous cycles of R′, the system reaches a system state cstop ∈ R′ for which
∀pj ∈ P : (t, •) ∈ Spj : t ≥ ttop holds (Lemma 8.5).
We show that there is no step that follows immediately after cstop in which any server
responds to a query request of a write operation. No server responds to a query request
due to the fact that ∀pj ∈ P : (t, •) ∈ Spj in cstop and item 1 of Figure 3.
We show that Condition (1) holds in c′′ ∈ R′. Every write operation that has started before
cstop terminates eventually (Theorem 8.22.1 with respect to Part (1) of Definition 8.22) or they
cannot proceed beyond the pre-write phase. (This is because R is a fair execution and each write
operation occurs within a constant number of phases and gossip rounds, we note that termination
occurs within O(1) asynchronous cycles, because each phase occurs within O(1) asynchronous
cycles, as we show in Part (3) of Corollary 6.2.) Let c′′′ be the first system state in which all of
these write operations have terminated (or have stopped forever to proceed beyond the pre-write
phase). Let t′ = maxpj∈P maxPhasej(D) : t′ ≥ t ≥ ttop and t′′ = maxpk∈P maxPhasek(D\{‘pre’})
in c′′′. Recall that the server at pj gossips (t′, •) and the server at pk gossips (•, t′′, •). Lemma 8.5
implies that within O(1) asynchronous cycles in R′, the system reaches a state c′′′′ ∈ R′ in which
∀p` ∈ P : tagTuple`() = (t′, t′′, •). By line 63, we have that Condition (1) holds in c′′′′ and so does
this claim, because we have reached a contradiction with the assumption at the beginning of this
proof. 
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Lemma 10.4. Let R be a fair execution of the bounded variation of Algorithm 2 (Figure 3) with
a legitimate overflow record. (1) Within O(1) asynchronous cycles, the system reaches the first
system state c ∈ R in which it holds that there is a node pi ∈ P (that hosts a server that) stores
a record (t, •) ∈ Spi with tag t ≥ ttop. Also, we can write R = R′ ◦ RsameTagTuple ◦ R′′, such
that (2) within a prefix R′ of O(1) asynchronous cycles, the system reaches an unbounded suffix,
RsameTagTuple ◦R′′, that has a prefix RsameTagTuple of O(1) asynchronous cycles, such that Condi-
tion (1) holds in its starting system state, c′ ∈ RsameTagTuple. Moreover, (3) only then at least one
node calls globalReset(t′′), all nodes participate in that procedure and within O(Ψ) asynchronous
cycles they resume, which leads to the end of RsameTagTuple. Furthermore, (4) suppose that in
c′ ∈ RsameTagTuple it holds that ∃pj ∈ P : {(t′′ = (z, k), •, d) : d ∈ D \ {‘pre’}} ⊆ Spj , where t′′
is the tag value taken from Condition (1). Then, there is system state c′′ ∈ RsameTagTuple that
follows c′′ and in which ∀p` ∈ P : Sp` = {((1, k), •, ‘FIN’)}. Otherwise, (5) t′′ = t0 (line 47) and
∀p` ∈ P : Sp` = ∅ in c′ and c′′.
Proof. Part (1). Lemma 8.2 implies this part of the proof.
Part (2). Claim 10.3 implies this part.
Part (3). Note that, by this lemma’s assumption that R has a legitimate overflow record, the
starting system state of R includes no tag that is greater or equal to ttop. Moreover, there is a
node pi ∈ P for which it holds that ∀pk ∈ P : gossipi[k] = (t′, t′′, t′′) in c′, where t′ ≥ ttop ∧ t′ ≥ t′′,
because of Part (2) of this proof which implies that Condition (1) holds in c′. Therefore, the only
way in which gossipi[k] = (t
′, t′′, t′′) can hold in c′, is if tagTuplek() = (t′, t′′, t′′) holds in some
system state that appears in R before (and perhaps also after) c′ (and then these tags are gossiped
from pk to pi), because these tag values do not appear in R’s starting state. Moreover, at least one
node calls globalReset(t′′) (due to item 2 of Figure 3 and the fact that Condition (1) holds in c′).
Therefore, all nodes resume within O(Ψ) asynchronous cycles (Section 6.2.2), which leads to the
end of RsameTagTuple.
Part (4). Claim 10.5 considers the case in which more than one node calls globalReset(t′′)
(item 2 of Figure 3) and implies that all such calls in RsameTagTuple refers to the same FINALIZED
tag t′′ = (•, k). This part of the proof is implied by the fact that a call to globalReset(t′′) indeed
replaces t′′ by (1, k), cf. item 2 of Figure 3.
Claim 10.5. Suppose that RsameTagTuple includes two steps, ai and aj, in which pi and pj call
globalReset i(ti), and respectively, globalReset j(tj). It is true that ti = tj.
Proof. We prove this claim by assuming that ti 6= tj and then demonstrating a contradiction.
Suppose, without the loss of generality, that ai appears in RsameTagTuple before aj . Let us start
the proof by assuming that ti < tj before considering the complementary case of ti > tj . We show
that neither case is possible and thus this claim is correct.
The case of ti < tj. By Part (2) of the proof of this lemma, we know that pi calls globalReset i(ti)
in step ai only after pj has seen that the tag ti is a FINALIZED record, because Condition (1)
must hold with respect to ti (item 2 of Figure 3) and the definition of tagTuple() (line 68). This is
true starting from some system state that appears in R before the steps ai and aj . When pi takes
step ai and calls globalReset i(ti), it is true that pi has not seen tj in a finalized (or FINALIZED)
record, due to this case assumption that ti < tj and the fact that Condition (1) holds with respect
to tag ti in the system state that immediately precedes ai (item 2 of Figure 3). Once pi takes
step ai and calls globalReset i(ti), the function globalReset() disables pi’s server and therefore pi’s
server does not receive or send in RsameTagTuple gossip messages after ai. Therefore, pi does not
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receive the tag tj (in a finalized or FINALIZED record) in any step that follows ai in RsameTagTuple.
Moreover, the fact that pi does not gossip after ai implies that pj cannot receive from pi a gossip
message with (•, tj , tj) (lines 58 and 65). Thus, gossipj [i] = (•, tj , tj) does not hold in any system
state in RsameTagTuple that follows ai. This is in contradiction to the assumption that pj takes step
aj ∈ RsameTagTuple, because this step requires Condition (1) to hold with respect to tj (item 2 of
Figure 3).
The case of ti > tj. By Part (2) of the proof of this lemma, we know that pi calls globalReset i(ti)
in step ai only after pj has seen the tag ti is a FINALIZED record, because Condition (1) must
hold with respect to ti (item 2 of Figure 3) and the definition of tagTuple() (line 68). This is true
starting from some system state that appears in R before the steps ai and aj . The fact that, in
the system state that immediately precedes step aj in which pj calls globalReset j(tj), node pj has
indeed seen ti in a finalized (or FINALIZED) record, demonstrates a contradiction due to this case
assumption that ti > tj and our assumption that aj appears in R after ai, because pj should select
tj according to Condition (1) (item 2 of Figure 3).
Part (5). This part refers to a case in which no server stores any finalized record. Thus, by
the arguments above, there is at least one nodes that calls globalReset j(t0). Since no server stores
any record, the tag t0 is used (line 47), and this part of the proof flows simply from item 2 of
Figure 3.
Theorem 10.5.1 (Bounded self-stabilizing CAS(k) in the presence of seldom fairness). Algo-
rithm 2’s variation in Figure 3 is a bounded (message and state) size self-stabilizing algorithm
(in the presence of seldom fairness) for implementing TCAS(k)’s task. Both the recovery and the
overflow periods end within O(Ψ) asynchronous cycles.
Proof. We demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is self-stabilizing (in the presence of seldom
fairness). To that end, we show that (1) the proposed algorithm can always recover within O(Ψ)
asynchronous cycles from an arbitrary starting system state of a fair execution, (2) during arbitrary
executions that start from a legitimate system state, the system execution is legal, but (3) once
in every O(zmax) write operations, the system stops providing liveness until the system execution
becomes fair and then within O(Ψ) asynchronous cycles (during which safety is not violated)
liveness is regained.
Part (1). Theorem 8.22.1 (with respect to Part (1) of Definition 8.22) demonstrates that the
operations of Algorithms 2 always terminate. Lemma 10.2 demonstrates that the added mechanisms
for dealing with overflow events (Figure 3) always finish to deal with overflows and then the system
simply follows Algorithms 2 for a period of at least zmax write operations.
The proof of Theorem 8.12.1 considers a complete write operation, piwrite, that its tag is greater
than any tag that is present throughout any earlier stage of the recovery process, i.e., including
the set of tags that appeared in the starting system state. As long as no overflow event occurs,
within O(1) asynchronous cycles, the system can complete the write operation, piwrite, such that
T (piwrite)’s record stays at the set relevant(Si) at least until a later write operation is completed.
If an overflow handling is needed, recovery occurs within O(Ψ) asynchronous cycles (Lemma 10.4).
Part (2). Algorithm 2’s correctness (theorems 8.15.1 and 8.22.1) implies this part.
Part (3). Lemma 10.4 implies this part.
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11 Cost Analysis
The main complexity measures of self-stabilizing systems in the presence of seldom fairness are
(Section 5.6): (ii) the maximum length overflow period, which is of O(Ψ) asynchronous cycles
(Theorem 10.5.1) for the proposed solution, and (ii) the maximum length of the period during
which the system recovers after the occurrence of transient failures, which is O(1) asynchronous
cycles for the case of the unbounded solution (Theorem 8.12.1) but can also takeO(Ψ) asynchronous
cycles if the recovery period includes an overflow (or a recovery of the overflow mechanism).
Cadambe et al. [12] present a version of the CAS(k) algorithm that includes elements of garbage
collection that recycles merely the stored objects and never the meta-data, i.e., it never removes
the records themselves, because the garbage collector removes only the coded elements and always
keeps the tags and the phase indices. In the context of self-stabilizing systems, this implies that
the storage is unbounded, because a single transient fault can clog the storage. Cadambe et al.
also explicitly say that when the execution is unfair, an infinite storage is required [12, Table 1].
One of the advantages of Algorithm 2’s variation in Figure 3 is that it offers bounded local storage
of O(N + δ) records also during periods in which the execution is unfair (Theorem 9.17.1), i.e.,
O((log2 |V|)(N + δ)) bits in total.
The proposed solution has write operations that include four phases rather than three, as in [12].
Cadambe et al. [12, Theorem 4] analyze the communication costs of CAS(k) and show that they
can be made as small as NN−f log2 |V| bits by choosing k = N − 2f . Moreover, Algorithm 2 and its
variation in Figure 3 consider gossip messages that include three tags, rather than just one as in
Cadambe et al. [12]. When comparing the communication costs of a self-stabilizing algorithm to
another that does not consider recovery from transient faults, we have to take into consideration that
fact that self-stabilizing algorithms can never stop communicating (because then the system can
be first brought to a state in which communication stops and then a transient-fault merely change
some part of that state, which the algorithm cannot correct because it has stopped communicating,
see [14, Chapter 3.2] for details). Therefore, the proposed algorithm never stops sending gossip
messages whereas the one by Cadambe et al. [12, Theorem 4] sends O(N2) gossip messages per
client operation.
12 Discussion
We studied the implementation of private coded atomic storage protocol, which is resilient to
malicious servers. For the case of asynchronous message-passing networks that provide fair com-
munication, we proposed a self-stabilizing algorithm that preserves privacy and recovers after the
occurrence of transient faults. Our solution requires the system to first reach a fair execution be-
fore the algorithm guarantees recovery. Moreover, once in a practically infinite number of write
operations, the proposed solution again requires fair execution to the end of dealing with counter
overflows. Since overflow events of 64-bit integers, in any practical settings, can only be the result
of transient faults, and since transient faults are very rare, we believe that our novel stabilization
criteria are applicable to a range of similar problems that require self-stabilizing tag schemes. Thus,
as future work, we propose to the study of self-stabilizing (in the presence of seldom fairness) of
consensus [7, 25], virtual synchrony [18] and other shared register emulation schemes [27], to name
a few.
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12.1 Extension: recyclable client identifiers
In Section 5.3.1, we assume that clients that fail-stop and never return to take steps. We present
here an elegant extension that is based on well-known techniques. This extension allows the nodes
to recycle their client identifiers whenever they resume operation after failing. That is, we tolerate
detectable restarts of the client nodes. For dealing with detectable restarts of the server nodes, we
point out the existence of self-stabilizing quorum reconfiguration [19–21].
The client identifier could be a pair that includes the identifier of node pi and an incarnation
number that is incremented whenever a failing node resumes and then wishes to invoke client
operations. A well-known technique for maintaining a persistent incarnation number (without
assuming access to a stable storage or that the storage is not prone to corruption by transient-
faults) is to let a quorum service to emulate a shared counter, similar to the one in [17, Section
3.3]. Namely, pi queries all servers for its current maximal incarnation number and waits for a
quorum of replies. Then, the client sends to all servers its updated incarnation number, which is
the maximum in all query replies plus one and waits for a quorum of replies before invoking the
next client operation. Note that each node pi that hosts a client has to maintain its own incarnation
counter (by using the client identifier for partitioning the space of incarnation numbers) and that
the above procedure is executed only when pi resumes after failing.
We end the description of this extension by saying that the bounded variation of Algorithm 2
(Section 3) includes a global reset procedure that resets all clients and server. This reset procedure
can also reset the above mechanisms for recyclable client identifiers. In addition, whenever the
incarnation number reaches its maximum value, the global reset procedure is triggered. Note that
the latter happens only after the occurrence of a transient fault. Thus, the client never runs out
of incarnation numbers (in any participial settings). The description of the above procedure would
not be complete without saying that the servers gossip periodically the set of all known pairs of
client identifiers and their incarnation numbers. When such a set is received, the server updates
its local set by adding all the pairs that come from clients that it does not know and updating all
the existing pairs with the highest incarnation number. Note that the size of these sets is bounded
by the number of possible clients, N .
12.2 Conclusions
We view the criteria of self-stabilizing algorithms (in the presence of seldom fairness) as an attractive
alternative to both Dijkstra’s self-stabilization criterion [13], which for the sake of bounded recovery
period usually models fail-stop failure as transient faults [14], and the less restrictive criteria of
pseudo-self-stabilizing [10, 16] and practically-self-stabilizing systems [7, 18, 25], which do not
model fail-stop failure as transient faults, but do not offer a bounded recovery period. We consider
self-stabilizing systems (in the presence of seldom fairness) to be (i) wait-free (since they do not
assume execution fairness) in the absence of transient faults, and (ii) offering a bounded recovery
period from transient faults, as in Dijkstra’s self-stabilization criterion [13]. This is offered at the
expense of compromising liveness (without jeopardizing safety) for a bounded period that occurs
once in every practically infinite number of operations, of say, 264.
Acknowledgments: We thank Robert Gustafsson and Andreas Lindhe´ for useful discussions and
for helping to improve the presentation significantly.
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Appendix
13 Self-stabilizing Gossip and Quorum Services
Algorithm 3 provides an implementation that satisfies the requirements of Definition 6.1. We start
the algorithm description by refining the model with respect to the variables that Algorithm 3 uses
as well as its interfaces. We then detail the way in which Algorithm 3 provides the requirements
that appear in Definition 6.1.
13.1 Refined model
We assume that the system has access to a self-stabilizing end-to-end (reliable FIFO) message
delivery protocol [15, 22] (over unreliable non-FIFO channels that are subject to packet omissions,
reordering, and duplication). The self-stabilizing algorithms in [15, 22] circulate a token between
any pair of senders and receivers. Our pseudo-code interfaces that protocol via events for token
departure and arrival. Moreover, the self-stabilizing algorithms in [15, 22] guarantees that the
receiver raises eventually a token arrival event with a token that the sender had transmitted upon
its previous token departure event; exactly one token exists at any time that succeeds the recovery
period.
13.1.1 Variables
The gossip servers require two kinds of buffers (line 72): one for the messages that go out (gossipTx)
and another for the ones that come in (gossipRx[]). Node pi stores in gossipTx the needed to
transmit messages and in gossipRx[j] : j 6= i the ones that are arriving to pi from pj ’s gossip. We
use gossipRx[i] for aggregating these received values.
Four kinds of buffers facilitate the quorum-based communications, because this communication
pattern has a round-trip nature that a client initiates and includes a number of nodes (line 73).
The initiating client write the message to pingTx. The end-to-end communication protocol [15, 22]
transfers that message to the server-side and stores it in pongTx[]. The server processes the arriving
messages and stores its reply in pongRx[] so that the end-to-end protocol could transfer this reply
back to the client-side, which stores it in pingRx[]. When any of this buffers does not store a
message, the ⊥ symbol is used. Note that the client requests take the form of (tag, word, phase) ∈
F = (T ∪ {⊥}) × (W ∪ {⊥}) × (D ∪ {‘qry’}), where phase = ‘qry’ whenever the clients sends a
query (rather than another phase that does appear in D). The reply has the form of (ping, pong) ∈
F ∪ {⊥} × F ∪ {⊥}. We use the variable aggregated for letting the client to aggregate the server
responses for the latest request (line 74).
13.1.2 Interface that Algorithm 3 assumes to be available
Every pair of nodes maintains a pair of self-stabilizing communication channels [15, 22], i.e., one
channel in each direction, which circulates a token between the sender and the receiver. The code
interfaces that protocol via events for token departure (lines 82, 85 and 86) and arrival (lines 83, 89
and 93). Moreover, this protocol guarantees that the receiver raises eventually a token arrival event
with a token that the sender had transmitted upon its previous token departure event. Exactly one
token exists at any time. In the code, token arrival and departure events raise the respective events
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according to the message type, which are gossip and quorum. The event handlers to these events
perform local operations, release the token by calling send(receiverID, Payload) as well as raising
other local events on the calling node. Algorithm 3 also assumes access to a primitive, which we
call suspend(). When an event calls suspend(var, const), the system suspends the calling event
until var = const (while allowing other non-suspended events on that node to run).
13.2 The details of Algorithm 3
The gossip functionality simply sends the message in gossipTx whenever the token arrives to the
client (line 82), stores it in gossipRx[j] whenever the token arrives to the server (line 83) and
raises the gossip arrival event at the server-side with all the most recently arrived gossip messages
from each server (line 84). Note that when a gossip message arrives, the receiving server raises
an event with {gossip[k]}pk∈P , which includes the most recently received messages. We allow a
simpler presentation of Algorithm 2 by letting the server at node pi to use the item gossip[i] for
aggregating the gossip information that it later gossips to all other servers.
The ping-pong protocol is inspired by the Communicate protocol proposed by Attiya at el. [4,
Section 3]. The client sends its message to the server upon token departure (line 85), update
the server buffer upon token arrival (line 88), and then the server sends its reply upon its token
departure (line 88) before the token arrival event allows the client to accumulate the server replies
(line 89). The client then tests whether it has accumulated replies from a quorum of servers
(line 95). If this is the case, it lets the calling client procedure to receive the accumulated replies
(line 97).
Note that, for the sake of simple presentation of Algorithm 2, we allow the client to call
qrmAccess(msg) either when msg is a single message to be sent to all servers or when msg is
a vector that includes an individual message for each server (line 85 and line 101).
13.3 Correctness of Algorithm 3
Theorem 13.1.1 shows that the system always reaches a legal execution (Definition 6.1) and uses
Remark 13.1.
Remark 13.1. Recall that we assume that use of a self-stabilizing communication channel be-
tween any pair of nodes, such as in [15, 22], for guaranteeing reliable end-to-end message delivery.
In [15, 22], the receiver raises eventually a token arrival event with a message that the sender had
transmitted upon its previous token departure event, such that, at any time, there is exactly one
token carrying one message. And, the token traversal direction alternates, i.e., go from one peer to
another, then back, then go again and so on.
Theorem 13.1.1 provides a proof for Corollary 6.2.
Theorem 13.1.1 (Self-stabilizing gossip and quorum-based communications). Let R be an Algo-
rithm 3’s (unbounded) execution that satisfies the terms of service of the quorum-based communi-
cation functionality. Suppose that R is fair and its starting system state is arbitrary. Within O(1)
asynchronous cycles, R reaches a suffix R′ in which (1) the gossip, and (2) the quorum-based com-
munication functionalities are correct. (3) During R′, the gossip and quorum-based communication
complete correctly their operations within O(1) asynchronous cycles.
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Algorithm 3: Self-stabilizing gossip and quorum-based communication, code for node pi.
72 Variables: gossipTx and gossipRx[] are buffers, where pi’s server stores in gossipTx the needed to transmit
message. In gossipRx[j] : j 6= i, pi’s server stores the most recently received pj ’s gossip and allowing the use
of gossipRx[i] for aggregating these received values.
73 pingTx, pingRx[], pongTx[] and pongRx[] are buffers, where pi’s client stores in pingTx its request, or ⊥. In
pingRx[j], pi’s server stores the most recently received pj ’s request, or ⊥. In pongTx[j], pi’s server stores the
reply to pj , or ⊥. In pongRx[j], pi’s client stores the most recently received pj ’s acknowledgment, or ⊥. The
client request and pingTx has the form (tag, word, phase) ∈ F = (T ∪ {⊥})× (W ∪ {⊥})× (D ∪ {‘qry’}).
The reply form is (ping, pong) ∈ F ∪ {⊥} × F ∪ {⊥}.
74 aggregated is a variable in which pi’s client stores the collected server responses for the latest request;
75 Interface in use: Every pair of nodes maintain self-stabilizing communication channel [15, 22], which
circulates a token between the sender and the receiver. Token arrival and departure events raises the
respective events according to channel type, which are gossip and quorum.;
76 suspend(var, const) suspends the calling event until var = const (while allowing other events to run);
77 Interface provided:
78 function gossip(msg) do gossipTx← msg;
79 function qrmAccess(msg) do phaseInit(msg); return(wait());
80 function reply(j,m) do {if pingRx[j].phase = ‘qry’ then pongTx[j]← (m.tag,⊥, ‘qry’) else pongTx[j]←
(pingRx[j].tag,m.word, pingRx[j].phase)}
81 Event handlers and local functions:
82 upon gossip token departure from pi’s server to pj ’s server do send(j, gossipTx);
83 upon gossip token m arrival from pj ’s server to pi’s server do
84 gossipRx[j]← m; raise the gossip arrival event with the message {gossipRx[k]}pk∈P ;
85 upon pingpong token departure from pi’s client to pj ’s server do send(j, load(j, pingTx));
86 upon pingpong token departure from pi’s server to pj ’s client do
87 if pingRx[j] = ⊥ then send(j, (⊥,⊥)); /* ignore the server during channel resets */
88 if pingRx[j] 6= ⊥ then send(j, (pingRx[j], pongTx[j]));
89 upon pingpong token arrival from pj ’s client to pi’s server do
90 pingRx[j]← pingpong; /* pingpong is either ⊥ or msg */
91 if pingRx[j] 6= ⊥ then /* don’t interrupt the server during channel resets */
92 raise the event of pingRx[j].phase arrival from pj ’s server with pingRx[j].msg (unless it is ⊥)
93 upon pingpong = (ping, pong) token arrival from pj ’s server to pi’s client do
94 if load(j, pingTx) = ping ∧ (pong = ⊥ ∨ pong.tag = ⊥ ∨ ((ping.phase 6= ‘qry’) =⇒ (ping.tag =
pong.tag))) then pongRx[j]← pong;
95 if {pj : pongRx[j] 6= ⊥} ∈ Q then /* test for a quorum of acknowledgments */
96 aggregated← {pongRx[j].word : pongRx[j] 6= ⊥};
97 clear(); /* returns from ping.phase with aggregated as the acknowledgment set */
98 function clear() do begin foreach pk ∈ P do pongRx[k]← ⊥ end; pingTx← ⊥;
99 function phaseInit(m) do begin foreach pk ∈ P do pongRx[k]← ⊥ end; pingTx← m;
100 function wait() do suspend(pingTx,⊥); let x = aggregated; aggregated← ∅; return(x);
101 function load(j,m) do if m = ((•, w1, •), . . . , (•, wN , •)) then return (•, wj , •) else return m;
Proof. Part (1). Let agossip,` ∈ R be a step in which the server at pj ∈ P calls gossip(m`) for
the `-th time in R (line 78). Note that agossip,` copies m to gossipTxi (line 78). Let adepart,`′ ∈ R
be the first step in R that appears after agossip,`′ : `
′ ∈ {1, . . .} and before agossip,`′+1, if there is any
such step, in which pj executes the event of gossip token departure (line 82). Note that adepart,`′
transmits to the server at pk ∈ P the token m`′ , where m`′ = gossipTxi[i] in any system state that
is between agossip,`′ and adepart,`′ . That token arrives eventually to the server at pk, which raises
the respective event (line 83) and then the event of gossip arrival with the message m`′ (line 84).
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Thus, the gossip functionality is correct (Definition 6.1), because (1) m`′ was indeed sent by pj ,
and (2) pk delivers such message infinitely often.
Correct behavior of the gossip functionality. Suppose that (1) every message that pk delivers
to the upper layer as a gossip from pj (line 83) was indeed sent by pj earlier in R (line 78). Moreover,
(2) such deliveries occur infinitely often in R. Furthermore, (3) at any time, the communication
channel from pj to pk does not include a message that pj has never sent. In this case, we say that
the behavior of the gossip functionality from the server at pj to the one at pk is correct.
Part (2). Claims 13.2 and 13.3 imply the proof of this part.
Claim 13.2. Suppose that the client at pi sends a request, i.e., pi calls the function qrmAccess(m)
(line 79) in step aqrmAccess ∈ R, where m 6= ⊥. After aqrmAccess, execution R includes steps (i) to
(v) (Definition 6.1).
Proof: In aqrmAccess, node pi assigns mi 6= ⊥ to pingTxi (line 79) and then suspends the running
client (while allowing other events to run concurrently) until pingTxi = ⊥, where mi ∈ F . Recall
that only the client calls the function qrmAccess() (Algorithm 2) and it does so sequentially (terms
of service for the quorum-based communication functionality, Definition 6.1). Thus, after aqrmAccess,
the only way in which pi assigns ⊥ to pingTxi is by executing line 97. Therefore, the invariant of
pingTxi = mi 6= ⊥ holds until the client at pi takes the step (v), which returns from the function
that it had called in step adepart with aggregated as the acknowledgment set. We show that after
aqrmAccess, the system takes the steps (i) to (v).
Steps (i) and (ii). Let adepart be the first step in R that appears after aqrmAccess and in which pi
executes the event of ping-pong token departure from the client at pi to the server at pj (line 85).
Note that pi transmits the message mi = pingTxi in adepart. That token arrives eventually to
the server at pj (Remark 13.1), which raises the respective event at some step aj ∈ R (line 89)
and then the event of pingRx[j].phase arrival (also in step aj), which delivers the arriving token,
pingRx[j].msg (line 92), unless the latter is ⊥. Let Qˆ(i),(ii) ⊆ P include the set of nodes, such as
pj , that their servers raise the latter two events (in step aj). Note that, as long as the invariant
of pingTxi = mi 6= ⊥ holds, Qˆ(i),(ii) includes more and more nodes. Thus, Qˆ(i),(ii) ∈ Q eventually
(Property (2) of Lemma 4.1).
Steps (iii). Recall that this lemma assumes that in R the server at pj ∈ P acknowledges (by
calling reply(msg), line 80) requests that pj delivers to it (terms of service for the quorum-based
communication functionality, Definition 6.1). Let aj′ ∈ R refer to these steps and Qˆ(iii) ⊆ P
include the set of nodes, such as pj , that take these steps, aj′ . Note that, as long as the invariant of
pingTxi = mi 6= ⊥ holds, Qˆ(iii) includes more and more nodes. Thus, Qˆ(i),(ii),(iii) ∈ Q eventually
(Property (2) of Lemma 4.1).
Steps (iv) and (v). The server at pj eventually sends the token (pingRxj [i], pongTxj [i])
(line 88), cf. Remark 13.1. Note that the sent token includes (in the ping field) aqrmAccess’s request
and (in the pong field) the same phase and tag of the arriving request (line 80), if the sent request
includes any such values. Moreover, that token arrives eventually from the server at pj to the client
at pi (Remark 13.1) at some step aj′′ ∈ R, which raises the respective event (line 93). Recall that
node pi cannot change the value of pingTxi 6= ⊥ before the if-statement condition of line 94 holds.
By the fact that the arriving token includes the same phase and tag, if there is any, of the sent
request pingTxi, node pi collects the arriving acknowledgments until the if-statement condition of
line 94 holds eventually. Let Qˆ(iv) ⊆ P be the set of nodes, such as pj , for which the pi takes
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the step aj′′ . Note that, as long as the invariant of pingTxi = mi 6= ⊥ holds, Qˆ(iv) includes more
and more nodes. Thus, Qˆ(iv) ∈ Q eventually (Property (2) of Lemma 4.1). This implies that pi
also takes the step ai ∈ R in which pi lets the function (which pi had previously called in step
aqrmAccess) to return (line 97) by calling clear() (line 97) and by that allowing the resume of the
client and the return from the function that has sent the request. Only then does the invariant
pingTxi 6= ⊥ stops from holding. We remind that aggregated holds the set of server replies that
were sent between aqrmAccess and ai as well as matched pi’s request, used the same phase and tag,
if there were any such values in pi’s request. 
Claim 13.3. Suppose that the state of the client at pi includes a non-⊥ value in pingTxi. Even-
tually, pingTxi = ⊥ (and the client at pi resumes, if it had been suspended).
Proof: Suppose that the client at pi calls eventually the function qrmAccess() (line 79). Then,
by Claim 13.2 the proof of this claim is done. Suppose that, throughout R, the client at pi does
not call the qrmAccess() function and yet pingTxi 6= ⊥ (in R’s starting system state). We show
that pingTxi = ⊥ eventually. Recall that pingTx 6= ⊥ has the form of (tag, •, phase) ∈ F , where
F = (T ∪{⊥})×{•}×(D∪{‘qry’}) and the replies have the form of (ping, pong) ∈ F∪{⊥}×F∪{⊥}
(line 73). Note that eventually when pj sends a token back to pi (line 86). That token is either
(⊥,⊥) or (pinj , ponj), where pinj is the request pingRxj [i] that pj had received from pi and ponj
is (pingRx[j].tag, •, pingRx[j].phase) (line 80). By the same arguments that appears in the proof
of Claim 13.2, this proof is done. Namely, as long as pingTx 6= ⊥ we have pinj 6= ⊥ and we can
apply ‘steps (iv) and (v)’ in the proof of Claim 13.2. 
Part (3). By the proof of Part (1) of this lemma, we see that the correctness invariant of the
gossip service holds within O(1) asynchronous cycles because it considers the propagation of a
single message from pj to every pk ∈ P, i.e., it requires a single complete server iteration (with
round-trips). By the proof of Part (2) of this lemma, we see that the correctness invariant of the
quorum-based communication service holds within O(1) asynchronous cycles because steps (i) and
(v) consider the propagation of a single message round-trip from a client to a quorum of servers,
i.e., it requires a single complete client round.
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